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ALTHOUGH  the return  to capital  is a focus of research  in both macroeco- 
nomics and public finance, each specialty has approached  this subject 
with an almost total disregard  for the other's contribution.  Macroeco- 
nomic studies  of the effect of inflation  on the rate of interest  have im- 
plicitly  ignored  the existence  of taxes and the problems  of tax deprecia- 
tion.'  Similarly,  empirical  studies  of the  incidence  of corporate  tax changes 
have  not recognized  that  the effect  of the tax depends  on the rate of infla- 
tion and  have  ignored  the information  on the rate  of return  that  investors 
receive  in financial  markets.2  Our  primary  purpose  in this  paper  is to begin 
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1. For a review of  recent empirical studies, see Thomas J. Sargent, "Interest 
Rates and Expected Inflation: A Selective Summary of Recent Research,"  Explora- 
tions in Economic Research, vol. 3 (Summer 1976), pp. 303-25. This criticism ap- 
plies also to Martin Feldstein and Otto Eckstein, "The Fundamental Determinants 
of the Interest  Rate,"  Review of Economics and Statistics,  vol. 52 (November 1970), 
pp. 363-75, and Martin  Feldstein and Gary Chamberlain,  "Multimarket  Expectations 
and the Rate of Interest,"  Journal  of Money, Credit, and Banking, vol. 5 (November 
1973), pp. 873-902. 
2. The prominent econometric studies include Marian Krzyzaniak and Richard 
A. Musgrave, The Shifting of the Corporation  Income Tax: An Empirical Study of 
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to build a bridge  between  these two approaches  to a common  empirical 
problem. 
The explicit recognition  of corporate  taxation substantially  changes 
the relation  between  the rates of inflation  and of interest  that is implied 
by equilibrium  theory.  The Fisherian  conclusion  that the nominal  rate of 
interest  rises  by the expected  rate of inflation,  leaving  the real rate of in- 
terest unchanged,  is no longer valid when borrowers  treat interest  pay- 
ments as a deductible  expense and pay tax on profits  net of accounting 
depreciation.3  A more general  theory  is discussed  in the first  section  and 
is used there  to analyze  the expected  impact  of changes  in inflation  with 
the tax and depreciation  rules  in effect  during  the past twenty-five  years. 
The analysis  shows that changes  in the rate of inflation  are likely to be 
significantly  nonneutral  even  in the  very  long run. 
Since the long-term  interest  rate measures  the yield available  to in- 
dividual  investors,  analysis  of it provides  an operational  way of studying 
the incidence  of changes  in corporate  tax rules. Oddly enough,  this nat- 
ural  way of measuring  tax incidence  has not been exploited  before. The 
first  section shows  how to translate  the postwar  changes  in tax rates and 
depreciation  rules  into the changes  in the interest  rate  that would  prevail 
if no shifting  occurred;  it thus lays the foundation  for econometric  esti- 
mates of the actual degree  of shifting  set out in later sections.  This ap- 
proach  requires  separating  the effects  of inflation  from the effects  of tax 
changes.  Since most of the postwar  changes  in corporate  taxation  have 
been in depreciation  rules and investment  credits, the effect of these 
changes  on the long-term  interest  rate is of obvious importance  in de- 
termining  their  potential  stimulus  to investment. 
In a previous  theoretical  paper,  Feldstein  analyzed  how an increase  in 
Its Short-Run  Effect upon the Rate of Return (Johns Hopkins Press, 1963); Robert 
J. Gordon, "The Incidence of the Corporation  Income Tax in U.S. Manufacturing, 
1925-62," American Economic Review, vol. 57 (September 1967), pp. 731-58;  and 
William H. Oakland, "Corporate  Earnings and Tax Shifting in U.S. Manufacturing, 
1930-1968," Review of Economics and Statistics,  vol. 54 (August 1972), pp. 235-44. 
Other major empirical studies include Arnold C. Harberger,  "The Incidence of the 
Corporation  Income Tax," Journal of Political Economy, vol. 70  (June 1962), pp. 
215-40,  and John B. Shoven and John Whalley, "A General Equilibrium Calcula- 
tion of the Effects of Differential Taxation of  Income from Capital in the U.S.," 
Journal of Public Economics, vol.  1 (November 1972), pp. 281-321.  None of this 
research  refers  to either inflation  or financial-market  return. 
3.  One statement  of Fisher's theory can be found in Irving Fisher, The Theory of 
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the rate  of inflation  would  alter  the interest  rate  in an economy  in steady- 
state  growth.  Although  that  model  brought  out the important  nonneutral- 
ity of inflation  and  the need to revise  Fisher's  theories  to reflect  taxation, 
its relevance  is severely  limited  by the assumptions  that all investment  is 
financed  by debt and that capital  goods do not depreciate.  Both of these 
restrictive  assumptions  were  relaxed  in a subsequent  paper  in which  firms 
were  assumed  to finance  investment  by a mixture  of debt and equity  and 
in which capital  depreciates.4  Introducing  depreciation  permits  an anal- 
ysis of the effect of allowing  only historic-cost  depreciation  for tax pur- 
poses. This more general  model shows that the way inflation  affects  the 
real interest  rate depends  on two countervailing  forces. The tax deduc- 
tibility of interest payments  tends to raise the real interest rate while 
historic-cost  depreciation  lowers  it. The net effect  can  be determined  only 
by a more explicit specification  of depreciation  and tax rules than was 
appropriate  in that  theoretical  study.  Such  an explicit  analysis  is presented 
in the first  section  below.  Equally  important,  the empirical  analysis  of the 
subsequent  sections does not assume  that saving is inelastic or that all 
forms  of investment  are  subject  to the same  tax rules. 
The three  main  sections  of our  paper  might  almost  be regarded  as three 
separate  studies  tied together  by the common  theme of inflation,  taxes, 
and the interest  rate. In the first  section,  we extend  previous  theoretical 
studies  of the interaction  of taxes and inflation  by making  explicit  calcu- 
lations  based on the actual  tax rules of the past two decades.  These cal- 
culations  show  how changes  in tax rules  and  in inflation  rates  have altered 
the maximum  nominal  interest  rate that firms  could pay on a standard 
investment.  An important  implication  of this analysis is that Fisher's 
famous conclusion is not valid in an economy with taxes on capital 
income. 
The second  section  is an econometric  analysis  of the observed  relation 
between  inflation  and the long-term  interest  rate.  A novel feature  of this 
analysis  is the use of an explicit  predicted  inflation  variable  which  is de- 
rived  from an optimal  forecasting  equation  based on an ARIMA (auto- 
regressive  integrated  moving  average)  process,  as described  there. 
4.  See Martin Feldstein, "Inflation,  Income Taxes and the Rate of Interest: A 
Theoretical Analysis," American Economic Review, vol. 66 (December 1976), pp. 
809-20; and Martin Feldstein, Jerry Green, and Eytan Sheshinski, "Inflation  and 
Taxes in a Growing Economy with Debt and Equity Finance," Journal of Political 
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The third  section  studies  the effects  of changes  in tax rules  and  in pre- 
tax profitability.  This section  is the most ambitious  in its attempt  to link 
the econometric  estimates  to the analytic  method developed  in the first 
section.  We regard  its results  as preliminary  because  all of our estimates 
are conditional  on specific  assumptions  about  the mix of debt and equity 
used  to finance  marginal  investments  and  about  the relative  yields  on debt 
and  equity  that  the market  imposes.  We believe  that  it is important  to ex- 
plore a wider range of assumptions  and that our method provides  the 
correct  framework  for such  an extended  analysis. 
A brief  concluding  section  summarizes  the  major  findings. 
The  Analytic  Framework 
The central  analytic  feature  of this paper is the operational  method 
of converting  any change  in tax rules and in expected  inflation  into the 
implied  change  in the long-term  interest  rate  that  is consistent  with a fixed 
marginal  product  of capital.  This method  is presented  in the current  sec- 
tion and is then used ( 1  ) to analyze  the effects  of specific  changes  in tax 
rules, (2)  to derive  the relevant  generalization  of the Fisherian  relation 
between  inflation  and the interest  rate, and (3)  to calculate  the implied 
equilibrium  interest  rate for each year from 1954 through  1976. These 
estimates  underpin  the empirical  analysis  in the rest of the paper. 
A  SIMPLE  ILLUSTRATIVE  MODEL 
It is useful  to begin  by analyzing  a simple  illustrative  case in which all 
marginal  investment  is financed  by debt.5  Moreover,  the aggregate  supply 
of loanable  funds is taken as fixed.6  We assume  also that all investment 
5. That the marginal investments  of all firms are financed  by debt does not pre- 
clude their using retained earnings to finance investment; this view is developed by 
Joseph E. Stiglitz in "Taxation,  Corporate  Financial Policy, and the Cost of Capital," 
Journal of Public Economics, vol. 2 (February 1973), pp. 1-34,  and Stiglitz, "The 
Corporation Tax," Journal of  Public Economics, vol.  5  (April-May  1976),  pp. 
303-11.  For a contrary argument, see Martin Feldstein, Jerry Green, and Eytan 
Sheshinski, "Corporate Financial Policy  and Taxation in a  Growing Economy," 
Quarterly  Journal  of Economics (forthcoming). 
6. This implies that the volume of saving is fixed and that the demand for money 
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is subject  to the same tax and depreciation  rules.7  While these assump- 
tions  do not even approximate  reality,  they do permit  a simple  exposition 
of our method. Working  through this simple case makes it easier to 
examine  the more general  framework  with  mixed debt-equity  finance,  an 
elastic  supply  of loanable  funds,  and  differential  tax  rules. 
We start  by examining  an economy  with no inflation  and see how tax 
changes  alter the rate of interest.  We then see how the interest  rate re- 
sponds  to inflation  under  alternative  tax and depreciation  rules. 
The diagram  below illustrates  the traditional  determination  of the 
equilibrium  interest  rate (i0), which  equates  the inelastic  supply  of loan- 
able funds (S)  to the downward-sloping  investment-demand  schedule 
(I).  In the absence  of taxes, each point on the investment  schedule  indi- 
Interest rate 
Investment 
7. This assumption ignores, for example, the difference between the tax treat- 
ment of  investment in plant and equipment and of  investment in residential real 
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cates  the internal  rate  of return  on the marginal  project  at the correspond- 
ing aggregate  level  of investment.8 
The introduction  of a corporate  income  tax with proper  economic  de- 
preciation  and the deductibility  of interest  payments  does not shift this 
investment  schedule;  any investment  that could pay a maximum  interest 
rate  of i before  the introduction  of the tax can pay exactly  the same  rate 
subsequently.9  In contrast,  an investment  tax credit or acceleration  of 
depreciation  would raise the maximum  potential  interest  rate on every 
project  and  would  therefore  shift  the investment-demand  schedule  to the 
right  to line I'. Given a completely  inelastic  supply  of investable  funds, 
such a tax change  simply  raises  the interest  rate without  any increase  in 
investment. 
Tax Changes.  Analyzing  quantitatively  the effect  of tax changes (and 
later of inflation) calls for an operational  method of  translating  tax 
changes  into changes  in the interest  rate-that  is, a method  of calculating 
i1 in the diagram;  the method  must be compatible  with a fixed marginal 
product  of capital.  To do this, we select a hypothetical  "standard  invest- 
ment"  and  calculate  the  internal  rate  of return  under  different  tax regimes. 
Consider  a standard  investment  in equipment  in which  the real  net output 
declines  exponentially  at 8 percent  a year'0  until the project  is scrapped 
at the end of T years;  the initial  value  of net output  (ao) is chosen  so that, 
in the absence  of any tax, the project  has an internal  rate of return  of 12 
percent." Such a project has net output ao(l  +  8)-t  in the tth year of its 
8. This is essentially Keynes' formulation of the schedule for the marginal effi- 
ciency of  investment. We implicitly assume that mutually exclusive options are 
described  by Irving Fisher's incremental  method and that multiple internal rates of 
return can be ignored. For a cautionary note about this procedure, see M. S. Feld- 
stein and J. S. Flemming, "The Problem of Time-Stream  Evaluation: Present Values 
versus Internal  Rate of Return Rules,"  Bulletin of the Oxford Institute  of Economics 
and Statistics,  vol. 26 (February 1964), pp. 79-85. 
9.  The pretax situation may be described by f '(I)  -  i = 0, where f '(I)  is the 
marginal  product of investment;  a tax at rate r with the deductibility  of interest does 
not change the implied value of i in (1 -T)  f(I)  -  (1 -)i  =  0. 
10. Note that this is "output decay" and not "depreciation";  see Martin S. Feld- 
stein and Michael Rothschild, "Towards  an Economic Theory of Replacement In- 
vestment,"  Econometrica,  vol. 42 (May 1974), pp. 393-423, for an analysis of these 
concepts. 
11. This is based on our earlier estimates of the pretax return on private invest- 
ment in nonfinancial corporations; see Martin Feldstein and Lawrence Summers, 
"Is the Rate of Profit Falling?" BPEA, 1:1977, pp. 211-27.  We raised the average 
return  of 10.6 percelnt  for 1948-76  reported there to 12 percent because we regard 
that sample period as overrepresenting  cyclically low years, but the choice of any 
constant  pretax  rate of return  does not alter our analysis. Martin  Feldstein  and Lawrence  Summers  67 
life, where  a, is selected  to satisfy 
(1) 
a0O~D~1 
+  ( 
)t 
=  1. 
t=  (I.12) 
t 
In practice,  it is important  to distinguish  between  investments  in equip- 
ment and in structures  because the depreciation  rules and tax credits 
affect  the two very  differently;  for example,  the investment  tax credit  does 
not apply  to structures.  Our "standard  investment"  is therefore  specified 
to be a mix of equipment  and structures  in the ratio of 1.95 to 1.12 The 
specification  of equation  1 is used  to describe  an investment  in equipment 
with a ten-year  life and an exponential  decay  rate of 13 percent.  The net 
output  of the investment  in structures  is assumed  to decay at 3 percent  a 
year and the structure  is scrapped  after  thirty  years;  the output  of a dol- 
lar's  investment  in new structures  is also chosen  to make the pretax  rate 
of return  equal to 12 percent.  The standard  investment  is a thirty-year 
"sandwich"  project,  of which 66.2 percent  of the investment  in the first 
year is in a standard  structure  and the remainder  is in equipment;  the 
equipment  is then  replaced  at the end  of ten and  twenty  years. 
The maximum  potential  interest  rate corresponding  to any given tax 
regime (that is, the value of i1 in the diagram)  is defined  as the interest 
rate that can be paid on the outstanding  balance of the loan used to 
finance  the project,  where  the balance  is reduced  to zero at the end of the 
life of the project.  If Lt is the loan balance  at time t and  xt is the net cash 
flow of the project  during  t (except for interest  expenses), the internal 
rate  of return  is the  interest  rate  i that  satisfies 
(2)  Lt-LLt-  =  iLt_1-xt,  t =1,.  ..,T, 
where Lo =  1 and LT  =  0.  In the special case of the pure equipment 
project  and  no tax, equation  2 reduces  to 
(3)  Lt-  Lt-  =  iLt,-  ao(I +  5)-t; 
the solution  of this equation  with  L, =  1 and  LT  =  0 is exactly  equivalent 
to the familiar  definition  of the internal  rate  of return  given  by equation  1. 
When  a tax at rate T  is levied on the net output  minus  the sum of the 
interest  payment  and the allowable  depreciation  (dt),  the loan balance 
changes  according  to 
(4)  Lt -Lt_  =  iLt,  -  Xt  +  T(Xt -  dt -  iLt-1). 
12. This figure, when used in conjunction with the procedure described below, 
yields an investment mix corresponding  to the average composition over the past 
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The value of i, corresponding  to any tax regime  is therefore  available 
by solving  for the value of i that is consistent  with equation  4 for our xt 
"sandwich"  with LT =  0 and L, equal to one minus  the investment  tax 
credit. 
Inflation. The preceding  method  of analysis  can also be used to ana- 
lyze the effect  of inflation  on the investment-demand  schedule  and  there- 
fore on the equilibrium  rate of interest  if the supply  of loanable  funds  is 
inelastic.  More generally,  the method  can be extended  to decompose  the 
increase  in the interest  rate  induced  by a rise  in inflation  into one part  due 
to the shift  in the demand  for funds  and  one due  to a shift  in the supply;  we 
return  to this  decomposition  below. 
It is again easiest to begin by examining  the case in which marginal 
projects  are financed  by debt only. Consider  first  the situation  in the ab- 
sence  of taxes.  In terms  of equation  2, the effect  of introducing  a constant 
expected  inflation  at rate vr is to raise the future  net profit  in each year 
by a factor (1 +  r)  t and thus to convert  the fundamental  equation  to 
(5)  Lt-Lti,  =  iLti,-(I  + r)txt,  t=  1,...,T. 
For any  sequence  of real  net profits,  the internal  rate  of return  i that  satis- 
fies the initial and terminal  equations  (Lo =  1, LT  = 0)  is increased  by 
exactly  the rate of inflation.'3  With  a fixed supply  of loanable  funds, this 
increase in the maximum  potential interest rate on all projects would 
raise  the equilibrium  interest  rate  by the  rate  of inflation. 
This Fisherian  conclusion  is no longer valid when taxes are consid- 
ered.'4  Equation  4 now  becomes 
(6)  Lt -  Lt-  =  iLt1  -  (1 +  r)tXt  +  T[(1 +  ir)txt  -  d(7r)t  -  iLt_l], 
where  d(r) t is the depreciation  allowed  for tax purposes  when there is 
inflation  at rate  7r.  Depending  on the depreciation  rule,  the nominal  maxi- 
mum  potential  interest  rate  may  rise  by more  or less than  the rate  of infla- 
tion. To see this, it is useful  to consider  the special  case in which  there  is 
no depreciation.  Equation  6 can  then  be written'5 
(7)  Lt -  Lt  =  (1  -  T)iLt_  -  (1 -  r)(1  +  r)tXt. 
13. There is actually a second-order  term: the internal rate of return rises from 
i without inflation to (1 + i) (1 +  7r) -  1  =  i +  7r +  ir  with inflation.  But the ir term 
vanishes  if interest  is compounded  continuously. 
14. These remarks are developed extensively in Feldstein, "Inflation, Income 
Taxes, and the Rate of Interest,"  and Feldstein, Green, and Sheshinski, "Inflation 
and  Taxes." 
15. Note that the asset appreciates  in nominal value but there is no tax due on 
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This is exactly  the same as 5 with the real project  output  replaced  by an 
after-tax  value, (1 -  7)xt, and the interest  rate by its after-tax  value, 
(1 -  7)i. The effect  of inflation  is therefore  to raise  the after-tax  potential 
rate of interest by exactly the rate of inflation: d[(l  -  -)i]/d7r  =  1, or 
di/d7r =  1/(1  -  7).  With  the  U.S.  marginal corporate  tax  rate  of  7 
= 0.48, this implies  that the maximum  potential  interest  rate  rises  by al- 
most 2 percentage  points  for each 1 percent  of inflation.  If the supply  of 
loanable funds were perfectly inelastic, the equilibrium  interest rate 
would also rise by nearly  2 points. 
The same relationship  prevails  if the asset depreciates  and if the his- 
toric-cost  basis of the depreciation  is increased  in proportion  to the price 
level.'6  Although  this degree  of sensitivity  of the interest  rate may seem 
surprising  at first,  it is easily understood:  each percentage  point of infla- 
tion permits  an increase  of 2 points  in the interest  rate  because  the after- 
tax cost of this increase  is only 1 point.'7  Moreover,  this "excess  adjust- 
ment"  of the pretax  interest  rate is just sufficient  to keep unchanged  the 
after-tax  return  to a lender  with  the same  marginal  tax  rate.'8 
The practice  of allowing  only historic-cost  depreciation  reduces the 
real  value  of depreciation  allowances  whenever  the  inflation  rate  increases. 
It is equivalent  to levying  a tax on the accruing  increases  in the nominal 
value of the asset. This extra  tax implies  that the real net-of-tax  yield to 
lenders  must be reduced  by inflation  and therefore  that an increase  in 
inflation raises the nominal pretax yield by less than 1/ (1 -  7).  Explicit 
calculations  of this  effect  will  now  be presented.'9 
Internal Rates of Return with Pure Debt  Finance.  Table  1 presents 
the calculated  maximum  potential  interest  rate  with  pure  debt  finance  for 
our  standard  investment  under  seven  tax regimes.  The rates  are  calculated 
first  on the assumption  of no inflation  and then on the assumption  of a 
constant  6 percent  rate  of inflation. 
16. See Feldstein, Green, and Sheshinski,  "Inflation  and Taxes." 
17. Note that with price-indexed  depreciation  there is no capital-gains  tax on the 
accruing  increase in the nominal value of the assets or, equivalently, on the decreas- 
ing real value of the liabilities. 
18. If borrowers  were taxed on the real capital gains that resulted from the de- 
creasing  real value of their liabilities, the interest rate would rise only by the rate of 
inflation.  To leave lenders with the same after-tax real return,  the real capital losses 
that result from the decreasing real value of  their liabilities would have to be a 
deductible  expense. 
19. The theory of this relation is discussed in Feldstein, Green, and Sheshinski, 
"Inflation  and Taxes";  see in particular  the appendix  to that paper  by Alan Auerbach. 70  Brookings Papers on Economic  Activity,  1:1978 
Table 1. Maximum  Potential  Interest  Rate with  100 Percent  Marginal  Debt Finance, 
Alternative  Tax Regimes  and  Inflation  Rates 
Percent 
Inflation  rate 
Tax regime  (corporate  tax rate,  depreciation 
method,  and other  provisions)  0  6 percent 
(A) No tax  12.0  18.0 
(B)  52 percent;  straight-line  depreciation  12.4  21.6 
(C)  52 percent;  accelerated  depreciation  as of 1960  13.3  22.6 
(D)  52 percent;  investment  tax credit of 5.6 percent; 
depreciation  as of 1963:4 with Long amendment  14.0  23.7 
(E)  Same as D, except Long amendment  repealed  14.2  23.8 
(F)  Same as E, except 48 percent  14.0  23.0 
(G) Current  law: 48 percent;  investment  tax credit of 
9 percent;-  asset depreciation  range  14.9  24.3 
Source: Derived by method described in text. 
a.  See text note 21. 
Consider  first  the results  corresponding  to no inflation-column 1 of 
table 1. By construction,  the maximum  potential  interest  rate (MPIR) in 
the absence  of both taxes and inflation  is 12 percent  for our standard  in- 
vestment.  Imposing  the tax regime  that existed  until 1954 (a 52 percent 
corporate  tax rate  and  straight-line  depreciation)  leaves  the MPIR essen- 
tially  unchanged  at 12.4 percent.20  Successive  tax regimes  liberalized  de- 
preciation  and raised the MPIR. The accelerated-depreciation  options 
introduced  in 1954 were adopted  only gradually,  but by 1960, the mix 
of depreciation  patterns  implied  an MPIR of 13.3 percent.  The introduc- 
tion of the investment  tax credit  raised  it further,  to 14 percent  in 1963. 
Currently,  because of a 10 percent  investment  tax credit and the asset- 
depreciation-range  (ADR) method  of depreciation,  the  MPIR  has  reached 
14.9 percent.2'  The tax changes  since 1954 have thus raised  the MPIR 
by one-fifth  of its original  value.22 
20. The MPIR is increased in the shift from regime A (no tax) to regime B be- 
cause straight-line  depreciation  is slightly more generous than true economic depre- 
ciation. 
21.  The effective rate of tax credit of 9 percent shown in the table differs from 
the statutory rate of  10 percent because of limitations on loss offset and carryover. 
Also, certain firms and types of investment are not eligible for the credit. In all our 
work, we use the effective rate. 
22.  Note that because interest is deductible, a lower tax rate actually lowers the 
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Comparing  the two columns  of table 1 reveals  the ways  in which  tax- 
ation  changes  the way  inflation  affects  the rate  of interest.  With  no tax, a 6 
percent  rate of inflation  raises the MPIR by 6 percentage  points-from 
12.0 to 18.0. In contrast,  with a 52 percent  tax and  straight-line  deprecia- 
tion (regime  B),  the 6 percent  inflation  raises the MPIR by 9.2 points 
(from 12.4 percent  to 21.6 percent). Thus di/d7r  =  1.53 in this regime. 
Note that a lender (bondholder)  thus experiences  an increase  in the real 
rate  of return  from 12.4 to 15.6 percent.  However,  since  the personal  tax 
is levied  on the full nominal  return,  the lender  will receive  a reduced  real 
return  after  tax unless  his marginal  tax rate is less than 35 percent.  At a 
personal  tax rate of 50 percent,  for example,  the real after-tax  yield on 
bonds  falls  from  6.2 percent  with  no inflation  to 4.8 percent  with  6 percent 
inflation. 
The same  pattern  can be followed  with all of the other  tax regimes  of 
the  postwar  period.  The figures  in column  2 show  that  under  every  regime, 
a 6 percent  inflation  rate would raise the nominal  rate of return  by be- 
tween  9.0 and  9.7 percentage  points. 
Although  the assumption  that  marginal  investments  are  financed  com- 
pletely  by debt  is a useful  analytic  simplification,  the implied  interest  rates 
shown  in columns  1 and  2 are  clearly  inconsistent  with  market  experience. 
The real  long-term  interest  rates  are  not (and never  have been during  the 
postwar  period) even remotely close to the high values presented  in 
table 1. We turn therefore to the more relevant case of investments 
financed  by a mix  of debt  and  equity. 
THE  INTEREST  RATE  WITH  MIXED  DEBT-EQUITY  FINANCE 
Our  view of the role of debt  and  equity  finance  starts  with the observa- 
tion that  issuing  more debt increases  the riskiness  of both the bonds and 
the stocks  of the firm.23  Issuing  additional  debt  thus  raises  the interest  rate 
that the firm  must  pay and lowers  the price of its shares.  The firm  there- 
fore does not finance all incremental  investment  by debt but selects a 
debt-equity  ratio  that,  given  tax rules  and  investor  preferences,  minimizes 
the cost of its capital.  If the firm  is in equilibrium,  the mix of debt and 
23. This view is developed explicitly in Feldstein, Green, and Sheshinski, "Cor- 
porate Financial Policy and Taxation."  The traditional  Modigliani-Miller  conclusion 
that the cost of capital is independent  of the debt-equity  ratio holds generally only 
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equity  used  to finance  an  incremental  investment  is the same  as its average 
debt-equity  investment.24  The interest  rate  that a firm  can  pay on a "stan- 
dard  investment"  depends  on this debt-equity  ratio and on the relation 
between  the equity  yield and the debt yield that is consistent  with the 
preferences  of portfolio  investors. 
In our analysis,  we assume  that the ratio  of debt to total capital  is one 
to three,  roughly  the average  ratio of nonfinancial  corporate  debt to the 
replacement  value of that sector's capital during  the past decade. Al- 
though  it would clearly  be desirable  to extend  our analysis  to make the 
debt-equity  ratio  endogenous,  this generalization  must  be postponed  until 
later  research. 
Our basic assumption  about the preference  of portfolio investors  is 
that, because  equity  investments  are riskier  than debt investments,  port- 
folio equilibrium  requires  a higher  yield on equity  than  on debt.  We con- 
sider  two variants  of the yield differential.  First, we assume  that the real 
equity  yield (denoted  by e)  must  exceed  the real  interest  rate (i -7r)  by 
a constant  risk  premium,  D.25 
(8)  e=[i-7r]+D. 
We shall examine  several  different  values  of D. Our  alternative  specifica- 
tion relates  the risk premium  to the difference  in real after-tax rates of 
return to an investor. Computational  results analogous  to table 1 are 
presented  for both specifications  and both are examined  in the econo- 
metric  analysis  below. 
If the portfolio  investor  has a marginal  personal  tax rate 0, the real 
after-tax return on a bond may be written i, =  (1 -0)  i -  7r.  Specifying 
the real after-tax  yield on equity  (en) is more  complex.  Let p be the frac- 
tion of the real equity  yield that  is paid out and (1 -  p) the fraction  that 
is retained.  The part  that is paid out is taxed at rate 0 while the retained 
earnings  are subject  only to an eventual  tax at the capital-gains  rate.  We 
use 09  to denote  the "equivalent  concurrent  capital-gains  tax rate"-that 
is, the  present  value  of the future  tax equivalent  to taxing  the  retained  earn- 
ings  immediately  at rate  09.  In addition  to these  taxes  on real equity  earn- 
24.  If the firm issues no new equity, it establishes its desired debt-equity ratio 
by its dividend  policy and its debt-issue  policy. 
25.  Since we assume a constant debt-equity ratio, changes in the risk premium 
are not induced by changes in that ratio. Note also that e includes the real gains 
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ings, the stock  investor  must also pay a tax on the nominal  capital  gains 
that  occur  solely  because  of inflation.  With  inflation  at rate  7r,  the resulting 
nominal  capital  gain at rate 7r  is subject  to capital-gains  tax at effective 
rate  0g. The  real  net return  may  therefore  be written: 
en =  [p(l  -  0) +  (1  -  p)(l  -  0g)]e -  0gr. 
Our  after-tax  alternative  to equation  8 is therefore 
(9)  en=  in +  D, 
or 
(10)  [p(l -0)  +  (1 -p)(l  -0g)e-e  r =  (1 -0)i-  +  D. 
For our numerical calculations,  we assume the reasonable values 
p=0.5,0=0.4,and09  =  0.10. 
The method  of calculating  the maximum  potential  interest  rate  used in 
the pure-debt  model (discussed  above) can be applied  to find  the values 
of i and  e that  satisfy  either  equation  8 or 9 for our  "standard  investment." 
Note that a firm's  net cost of funds (N) is a weighted  average  of the net- 
of-tax  interest  that  it pays  and  the  yield  on its equity.  In nominal  terms, 
(11)  N = b(1-r)i  +  (1-b)(e  +  r). 
In the special case of pure-debt finance, N  =  ( 1 -  -)i;  the solution of the 
difference  equation  6 provides  a value for i and, since z- is known,  for N 
as well. More generally,  regardless  of the mix of debt and equity  finance, 
the solution of equation 6 can be interpreted as equal to N! ( 1 -  ); that 
is, it is equal  to the cost of funds  to the firm  stated  as if all these  costs  were 
deductible  from  the  corporate  income  tax. 
To calculate  the value of i corresponding  to any tax regime  we there- 
fore proceed  in three steps. First, we solve equation  6 to obtain  a value 
of N/  (1  - v).  Second, we multiply this by (1  - v)  to obtain N. Finally, 
with  this  known  value  of N we can solve  the two equations  simultaneously 
(11 and8or 10) foriande. 
Table 2 presents  the interest  rates corresponding  to the pretax  port- 
folio-balance  rule of equation  8. Separate  results  with and without  infla- 
tion are presented  for three  risk premiums  (D =  0.06, 0.08, and 0.04). 
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Table  2. Maximum  Potential  Interest  Rate with  One-Third  Debt Finance  and 
Selected  Pretax  Risk Differentials  for Alternative  Tax Regimes  and  Inflation  Rates 
Percent 
Pretax risk differential  (D) 
6 percent  8 percent  4 percent 
Inflation  rate  Inflation  rate  Inflation  rate 
Tax regime  (corporate  tax 
rate,  depreciation  method,  and  0  6  0  6  0  6 
other  provisions)  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
(A) No tax  8.0  14.0  6.7  12.7  9.3  15.3 
(B)  52 percent;  straight-line 
depreciation  2.4  7.7  0.8  6.1  4.0  9.3 
(C) 52 percent;  accelerated 
depreciation  as of 1960  2.9  8.3  1.3  6.7  4.5  9.9 
(D)  52 percent;  investment  tax 
credit of 5.6 percent;  de- 
preciation  as of 1963:4 
with Long amendment  3.3  8.9  1.7  7.3  4.9  10.5 
(E)  Same as D, except  Long 
amendment  repealed  3.4  9.0  1.8  7.4  5.0  10.6 
(F)  Same  as E, except  48 
percent  3.8  9.4  2.2  7.8  5.4  11.0 
(G) Current  law: 48 percent; 
investment  tax credit of 9 
percent;a asset depreciation 
range  4.4  10.2  2.8  8.6  6.0  11.8 
Source: Derived by method described in text. 
a.  See text note 21. 
D = 0.06, are  much  closer to observed  experience  than  the results  based 
on complete  debt  finance  in table  1.26 
The numbers  in colunm 1 (zero inflation  rate) deserve  comment  for 
two reasons.  First,  unlike  the results  in the pure-debt  model  of table 1, the 
introduction  of the corporate  income  tax significantly  lowers  the implied 
bond yield. This reflects  the payment  of a significant  tax, which  must  re- 
duce  both the equity  and  debt yields.  Similarly,  in contrast  to table 1, the 
reduced  corporate  tax rate  in 1964 now causes  an increase  in the MPIR. 
Second,  the various  liberalizations  of depreciation  and the introduction 
26. Note  that in regimes B through G the values for D  =  0.08 and D =  0.04 
differ from the corresponding  values for D =  0.06 by 0.016. This constant difference 
holds to the three-decimal-place  accuracy of our table but is not an exact relation 
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of the investment  tax credit raise the MPIR. The absolute  increase  is 
smaller  than  in the pure-debt  case of table 1, but the proportional  rise is 
substantially  larger. 
The effect  of a 6 percent  inflation  rate  is seen by comparing  columns  1 
and 2. With  no tax, the MPIR rises  by the full amount  of the inflation;  a 
6 percent  inflation  raises  it from  8.0 percent  to 14.0 percent.  The presence 
of taxes again changes  this relation  but the effect is very different  with 
mixed  debt-equity  finance  than  in the pure-debt  case. In each of the tax 
regimes,  a 6 percent  inflation  rate  raises  the nominal  interest  rate  by only 
about  5.5 percent:  di/d7r  = 0.92. This  implies  that  the real rate  of return 
on debt  falls even for the lender (bondholder)  who is not subject  to any 
personal  tax. For a lender  who pays a significant  marginal  tax rate, the 
equilibrium  real net internal  rate  of return  can easily  be negative.  Under 
regime  C, the real  net yield to a 50 percent  taxpayer  falls from 1.45 per- 
cent to -1.85  percent.  With  the most recent  regime (G), the 6 percent 
inflation  rate  reduces  the real  net yield  from  2.2 percent  to -0.90  percent. 
Table 3 presents  the corresponding  maximum  potential  interest  rates 
for the net-of-tax  portfolio-balance  rule of equation  10. Again, the cor- 
porate  income  tax causes  a substantial  reduction  in the real interest  rate. 
The liberalized  depreciation  rules  raise  this interest  rate  substantially  but, 
even in the absence  of inflation,  it remains  significantly  below the value 
without  taxes.  The most  important  difference  between  the results  of tables 
2 and 3 is the greater  sensitivity  of MPIR to inflation  with the net-of-tax 
portfolio-balance  rule  of table 3. Comparing  columns  1 and 2 shows  that 
a 6 percent  inflation  rate would raise the nominal  MPIR by 7.5 percent 
under  regime B, implying  di/d-r =  1.25; this result is essentially  inde- 
pendent  of the differential  (D)  that is assumed.  The faster  writeoffs  that 
are  incorporated  in the succeeding  tax regimes  reduce  the extent  to which 
inflation  lowers the value of the tax depreciation.  The smaller adverse 
effect  on the value of depreciation  raises  di/drr;  the value of 1.25 under 
regime  B becomes 1.32 with regime  D and 1.33 with the current  regime 
(G). 
The maximum  potential  interest  rates shown in tables 2 and 3 have 
two very important  implications.  First, inflation  severely depresses  the 
real  net rate of return  (in)  that can be paid to a bondholder  on the basis 
of our standard  investment  project.  Consider  an investor  whose marginal 
tax rate is 40 percent.  Table 2 implies  that with current  law and a risk 
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Table  3. Maximum  Potential  Interest  Rate with  One-Third  Debt Finance  and 
Selected  Net-of-Tax  Risk Differentials  for Alternative  Tax Regimes  and  Inflation  Rates 
Percent 
Net-of-tax  risk differential  (D) 
6 percent  4 percent  5 percent 
Inflation  rate  Inflation  rate  Inflation  rate 
Tax regime  (corporate  tax 
rate,  depreciation  method,  0  6  0  6  0  6 
and  other  provisions)  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
(A) No tax  8.0  14.0  9.3  15.3  8.6  14.3 
(B)  52 percent;  straight-line 
depreciation  0.9  8.4  3.4  10.9  2.2  9.6 
(C)  52 percent;  accelerated  de- 
preciation  as of 1960  1.5  9.1  4.0  11.6  2.8  10.4 
(D)  52 percent;  investment  tax 
credit of 5.6 percent;  de- 
preciation  as of 1963:4 
with Long amendment  2.0  9.9  4.5  12.4  3.2  11.2 
(E)  Same as D, except  Long 
amendment  repealed  2.1  9.9  4.6  12.4  3.4  11.2 
(F)  Same as E, except  48 
percent  2.6  10.3  5.1  12.8  3.9  11.6 
(G) Current  law: 48 percent; 
investment  tax credit of 9 
percent;;a  asset depreciation 
range  3.3  11.3  5.8  13.8  4.6  12.6 
Source: Derived by method described in text. 
a. See text note 21. 
tax return  from 4.4 to 10.2 percent,  but reduces  the real net return  from 
2.6 percent  to 0.1 percent.  With  the more  favorable  assumptions  of table 
3, a 6 percent  inflation  reduces  the real  return  from  2.0 percent  to 0.8 per- 
cent. This has obvious  effects  on the incentive  to save and to make  risky 
portfolio  investments. 
The second implication  relates to the firm's  incentive  to invest. It is 
frequently  argued  that, because  their  real net borrowing  rate has fallen, 
firms  now have a greater  incentive  to invest  than  they did a few years  ago. 
The calculations  of tables 2 and 3 show that the inference  is wrong  be- 
cause inflation  also reduces the maximum  real net borrowing  rate that 
firms  can afford  to pay on any  investment.  Table  2 with  D =  0.06 implies 
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terest cost of 2.3 percent  on the standard  investment  project.27  Inflation 
at 6 percent  reduces the maximum  real after-tax  interest  rate for this 
project  below zero to -0.7  percent!28  The real net cost of debt finance 
must thus fall by 3.0 percentage  points to avoid reducing  the incentive 
to invest.  Similarly,  with table 3, the firm  could afford  a net interest  cost 
of 1.7 percent  in the absence  of inflation  but only a negative  cost, -0.1 
percent,  with 6 percent  inflation.  It is clear  that  the usual  way of evaluat- 
ing investment  incentives  in terms  of the real net cost of finance  is very 
misleading  with the U.S. tax system  when inflation  is significant.29 
THE  EFFECT  OF  A  VARIABLE  SUPPLY  OF 
INVESTABLE  FUNDS 
Until now, all of our calculations  have referred  to the same standard 
investment  project  and therefore  implicitly  to a fixed  supply  of investable 
funds. Moreover,  we have assumed  that inflation  has no effect on the 
supply  of loanable  funds  to the nonfinancial  corporate  sector.  The econo- 
metric  estimation  of the actual  effect  of changes  in the corporate  tax re- 
quires  attention  to both  of these  issues. 
Once again  we begin  by considering  an economy  in which there  is no 
inflation  and all marginal  investment  is financed  by debt.  The notion  of a 
fixed supply  of loanable  funds (the vertical  S line of the first diagram) 
rested  on the assumption  that our analysis  relates  to the entire  economy 
and  that  the supply  of saving  is interest  inelastic.  It is important  for sub- 
sequent  empirical  analysis  to drop these two assumptions.  Our econo- 
metric  analysis  will deal with the long-term  corporate  bond rate;  but the 
demand  for long-term  credit  comes  not only from  business  firms,  but also 
from  investors  in residential  real  estate,  from  state,  local, and  federal  gov- 
ernments,  and from abroad.  These investment  demands  are not directly 
affected  by the  investment  tax credit,  accelerated  depreciation,  or changes 
in the corporate  tax rate. This implies  that the supply  of loanable  funds 
to the nonfinancial  corporate  sector  is an increasing  function  of the long- 
term  bond  yield and  that  this supply  function  is not shifted  by the changes 
in corporate  tax rules.  This supply  elasticity  would  be increased  by a posi- 
27.  (1  -  )i  0.52(0.044)  =  0.0229. 
28.  (1  -  r)i-r  =  0.52(0.102)  -  0.06  =  -0.0070. 
29. The empirical  results of the next two sections suggest that the actual real net 
interest  rate falls by about enough to keep incentives to invest unchanged  despite the 
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tive response  of domestic  saving  and  international  capital  flows  to the net 
interest  rate. 
The diagram  presented  below is therefore  a more appropriate  repre- 
sentation  than the first one. A more liberal  depreciation  policy (a shift 
from  I to F') has a more  limited  effect  on the long-term  interest  rate. The 
magnitude  depends  on the elasticity  of the supply of loanable  funds to 
the nonfinancial  business  sector  and therefore  on both the relative  size of 




The ratio of the actual  change  in the long-term  interest  rate (i2 -  i0) 
to the change  that  would  have  occurred  (i,  -  i0) if investment  and  there- 
fore  the marginal  product  of capital  had  remained  the same  thus  measures 
the extent to which the tax change is shifted from corporate  capital to 
capital  elsewhere  and  to labor. 
Our empirical  analysis  below focuses on the extent of tax shifting  in 
this general sense. We look at the tax changes as summarized  by the Martin  Feldstein  and Lawrence  Summers  79 
change  in the corporate  maximum  potential  interest  rate and ask what 
impact  this potential  change  actually  had on the yields available  to port- 
folio investors with uncommitted funds. The ratio of (i2  -  i)  to (i  -  i)  is 
analogous  to the definition  of the incidence  of corporate  tax changes  used 
in previous  empirical  studies.30  This measure  of incidence  should  be dis- 
tinguished  from  the  more  general  concept  of the fraction  of the tax change 
borne  by capital  in all sectors.  A change  in the corporate  tax might  be 
borne solely by capital even though the corporate  sector bore only a 
modest fraction.31  Our estimate of the ratio of (i2-  io) to (il  -  io) there- 
fore does not measure  the shift of the tax change  from capital  to labor. 
We return  later to consider  how well our empirical  analysis  of the tax- 
induced  change  in the long-term  bond rate measures  the impact of the 
tax on the yield to capital  in general  and not just on the capital  invested 
in the corporate  sector. 
To implement  this approach,  we could calculate  the maximum  poten- 
tial interest  rate  for our  hypothetical  "standard  investment"  under  the tax 
regime  of each quarter  during  the sample  period. This would yield the 
i1 values  of the second diagram  corresponding  to different  tax rules.  We 
could then estimate  an equation  relating  the actual  interest  rate (i2) to 
these  values.  In practice,  however,  it is necessary  to allow  also for changes 
in inflation  that  shift  the  supply  of available  funds. 
The response  of supply  to changes  in the rate of inflation  depends  on 
three  basic  factors: ( 1  ) the effect  of nominal  interest  rates  on the demand 
for money;  (2)  the effect  of the real net interest  rate on saving;  and (3) 
the effect  of inflation  on the real  yields available  in other  forms  of invest- 
ment  open  to portfolio  investors.  Our  empirical  analysis  does not attempt 
to disentangle  these aspects  or to model explicitly  the effect of inflation 
on yields  of alternative  assets.32  Instead,  we distinguish  only between  the 
30. See, for  example, Krzyzaniak and Musgrave, Shifting of  the Corporation 
Income Tax, and Oakland,  "Corporate  Earnings and Tax Shifting."  However, these 
authors  analyzed the effect, not on uncommitted  funds, but on the return  of existing 
investments. 
31. See, for example, Harberger, "Incidence of the Corporation Income Tax," 
for an explicit analysis of the incidence of a change in the corporate  tax in an econ- 
omy with more than one sector. 
32. Benjamin  Friedman's  explicit modeling of the supply of and demand  for cor- 
porate  debt might usefully be extended in this direction. See, for example, Benjamin 
M. Friedman,  "Financial  Flow Variables  and the Short-Run  Determination  of Long- 
Term Interest Rates," Journal of Political Economy, vol.  85  (August 1977),  pp. 
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changes  in the rate  of interest  caused (1)  by the inflation-induced  rise in 
the nominal  rate  of return,  and (2) by all other  effects  of inflation. 
This distinction  is illustrated  in the third diagram.  In the absence  of 
inflation,  the equilibrium  interest  rate  is io and investment  is 10.  The effect 
of inflation  at rate  r is to raise  the investment-demand  schedule  to I'. In 
a pure Fisherian  economy, the vertical displacement  of this schedule 
would  equal  the rate  of inflation:  i4  -i  =  r. But with  taxes  and  historic- 
cost depreciation,  this vertical shift is likely to be somewhere  between 
r and r/  ( 1 -  r),  as it is in the diagram. Inflation will also shift the supply 
schedule  of loanable  funds  from  S to S'. In the pure  Fisherian  world,  this 
vertical  displacement  would also equal  the rate  of inflation:  i2 -o  =  , 
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Investment Martin  Feldstein  and Lawrence  Summers  81 
implying  i2 =  i1.33 More realistically, the supply shift will depend on the 
three factors identified  in the previous paragraph.  The change in the 
equilibrium  interest  rate will depend  on the shifts and the slopes of both 
the demand  and supply  schedules. 
As this analysis  indicates,  an empirical  study of the relation  between 
inflation  and the interest  rate should  not be construed  as a test of Irving 
Fisher's  theory.  With a complex structure  of taxes, Fisher's  conclusion 
would  not be expected  to hold. The purpose  of an empirical  study  should 
instead  be to assess the response  of nominal  long-term  interest  rates to 
inflation  and therefore  the effect on real after-tax  yields. The statistical 
analysis  presented  below therefore  begins by trying  to measure  this re- 
sponse of the interest  rate to expected  inflation;34  in terms of the third 
diagram, this coefficient equals (i3  -  i0)  r.  Our analysis can also go fur- 
ther  and estimate  how much  of the increase  in the interest  rate would be 
due to a shift in the demand  for funds with the supply schedule  fixed 
(i4  -  io)  and how much to the shift in supply with a fixed demand sched- 
ule  (i5  -  io).  With linear demand and supply schedules, this procedure 
provides an  exact decomposition of  the  observed changes: i3-  i 
=  (i4  -  i0)  +  (i5  -  i0) 
The current  discussion  of the effect  of inflation  when all marginal  in- 
vestments  are financed  by debt is extended  and applied  below to invest- 
ments  in which debt finance  provides  one-third  of marginal  capital and 
equity  finance,  two-thirds.  Our  analysis  assumes  that  the debt-equity  ratio 
is unaffected  by the rate of inflation  and that the real rates of return  to 
debt  and  equity  have  a constant  net  or gross  differential. 
Estimating  the Effect  of Inflation 
In this section we begin the empirical  investigation  of the impact of 
expected  inflation  on the long-term  rate of interest.  As we emphasized 
above,  we do not regard  this as a test of Fisher's  conclusion  since there 
is no reason  to expect such a one-for-one  impact  of inflation  on the in- 
terest  rate in an economy in which taxes play such an important  role. 
Instead,  our aim  is to estimate  the net impact  of expected  inflation  on the 
nominal  rate  of interest  in order  to assess  the effect  of inflation  on the real 
33. Note that if the supply is perfectly inelastic (that is, if the schedule is ver- 
tical), the Fisherian  result  can occur with no shift in supply. 
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cost of capital  and the real return  to investors.  If the supply  of loanable 
funds for the purchase  of bonds were fixed, we would expect the equi- 
librium  interest  rate to rise in the same way as the maximum  potential 
interest  rate.  In fact, however,  the supply  schedule  is likely to be neither 
completely  inelastic  nor  independent  of the inflation  rate.  Without  a much 
more  detailed  analysis,  we must  regard  a wide range  of inflation  impacts 
as  plausible  a priori. 
At this stage we focus on the relation  between the interest  rate and 
expected  inflation.  The next section  introduces  the effects  of changes  in 
tax and depreciation  rules. Since adding  the tax variable  does not alter 
the conclusion  about the effect of inflation,  we prefer to start with the 
simple  specification  in which  we can concentrate  on making  expected  in- 
flation  an  operational  concept. 
In all of our analyses,  we measure  the long-term  interest  rate by an 
average  of yields on new issues of high-grade  corporate  bonds, adjusted 
to be comparable  to the Aaa rate.35  The use of new-issue  yields is impor- 
tant  because  seasoned  issues  with  lower  coupon  rates  will also have lower 
market  yields owing  to the more  favorable  tax treatment  of capital  gains. 
The new-issue  yield,  however,  is influenced  by the call-protection  feature, 
which may make  it respond  more to inflation  rates than it would other- 
wise. 
The expected  rate of inflation  is defined  in terms  of the price of con- 
sumer  goods and services  as measured  by the deflator  of personal  con- 
sumption  expenditures  in GNP. In principle,  our analysis should rec- 
ognize  that  wage  rates  and  the  prices  of consumption  goods,  of investment 
goods, and of the output  of nonfinancial  corporations  do not move pro- 
portionately  and  would  be expected  to have  different  effects  on the supply 
and  demand  for investment  funds.  In practice,  it is not possible  to include 
more  than  one inflation  variable  and the choice does not alter the results 
in an essential  way. We use expectations  of the consumption  price for 
three  reasons:  (1 ) This  is the  price  that  should  affect  household  decisions. 
(2)  Although firms  produce investment  and intermediary  goods, they 
also  purchase  these  goods;  the consumption  price  may  therefore  be a good 
approximation  of the price of sales by the nonfinancial  corporate  sector 
to the rest of the economy. (3)  The future  movement  of nominal  wage 
rates  may be approximated  best by the expected  movement  in consumer 
prices. 
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This  section  develops  two approaches  to specifying  the expected  future 
rate  of inflation.  The  first  uses the familiar  distributed  lag on past  inflation 
rates, with the identifying  restriction  that the weights on past inflation 
must sum to one. Recognizing  that this restriction  may be invalid, we 
explore an alternative  approach  based on a series of separate  optimal 
forecasts  of inflation.  In practice,  the two approaches  lead to very  similar 
results. 
Consider  first the distributed-lag  approach  that has been used ever 
since Irving  Fisher's  own pioneering  work  on this subject.  We posit that 
the interest rate (i)  is related to expected inflation (*7)  according to 
(12)  it=  ,  +  317rt 
where 
T 




(14)  wj  =1. 
j=o 
Substituting  equation 13 into equation 12 yields the estimable  equation 
T 
(15)  it  =  #0  +  1  E  Wjrt-j. 
j=O 
The key coefficient  i1 is estimable  only because  of the identifying  restric- 
tion  of equation  14. 
Equation 15 was estimated  by assuming  that the weights on lagged 
inflation  (that is, j >  0)  satisfy a second-order  polynomial  and that T 
=  16 quarters;  the coefficient  of the concurrent  inflation  rate (j =0)  was 
unconstrained.  The basic parameter  estimates are presented  in equa- 
tion 16. (The numbers  in parentheses  here and  in the equations  that  fol- 
low are  standard  errors.) 
16 
(16)  it  =  3.05  +  0.19  rt  +  E~  wjir,t-i 
(0.17)  (0.05)  j= 
16 
f21w1  =  0.64. 
j-  (0.06) 
Sample  period: 1954:1-1976:4;  I2  082;  Durbin-Watson  0.21. 84  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity, 1:1978 
16 
The identifying restriction that  w; =  1 implies that P, =  0.83.88 With 
j=0 
no inflation,  the interest  rate would be 3.05 percent;  with a sustained 
(and hence  expected)  inflation  rate  of 6 percent,  the nominal  interest  rate 
would  rise  to 8.03 percent. 
Sargent  has rightly  emphasized  that  the identifying  restriction  of equa- 
tion 14 may be unwarranted.87  The optimal  weights (the wj) depend  on 
the nature  of the process  that is being  forecast.  If the rt remain  constant 
for a long time,  it is clearly  appropriate  that  the weights  sum  to unity and 
therefore  predict  that the same 7rt will continue.  But where  the historic 
pattern  of the rt  is more  varied,  a different  set of weights  will be optimal. 
Dropping  the restriction  of equation  14 leaves 8, in 15 underidentified. 
This apparently  led Sargent  to abandon  the estimation  of 81 and to at- 
tempt  to test  Fisher's  conclusion  indirectly  by examining  a rational-expec- 
tations  model of unemployment.38  We do not think that so circuitous  a 
route is necessary,  and propose instead to develop an explicit optimal 
forecast  measure  of expected  inflation  for use as a regressor  to estimate 
equation  12 directly. 
To derive  forecasts  of inflation  rates,  we use the optimal  ARIMA  fore- 
casting  procedure  of Box and Jenkins.39  We assume  that the forecasts 
made  at any  time  are  to be based  only on the information  available  at that 
time.  This  requires  reestimating  a separate  Box-Jenkins  equation  for each 
quarter  based  on the observations  available  as of that  quarter.  To relax  the 
assumption  that inflation rates are generated  by the same stochastic 
process over the entire postwar period, we specify that the ARIMA 
process  estimated  at each date  is based  only on the most recent  ten years 
of data.40  After some  preliminary  analysis  of the data,  we selected  a first- 
36. That is, 0.64 + 0.19, the latter being the coefficient  of 7rt. 
37. See Thomas J. Sargent, "Rational Expectations, the Real Rate of  Interest, 
and the Natural Rate of Unemployment,"  BPEA, 2:1973, pp. 429-72. 
38. Sargent  concludes that his indirect evidence was ambiguous.  When taxes are 
recognized, even the theoretical link between Sargent's equation and the inflation- 
interest  relation  is unclear. 
39. In principle, of course, the Box-Jenkins  procedure  is too restrictive  and one 
should derive forecasts from a completely specified econometric model. Unfortu- 
nately, doing so requires  projecting  all of the exogenous variables.  The more general 
procedure  that requires  estimates  of monetary  and fiscal policy for many years ahead 
would not necessarily  yield better forecasts than the simpler Box-Jenkins  procedure. 
See George E. P. Box and Gwilym M. Jenkins, Time Series Analysis: Forecasting 
and Control (Holden-Day, 1970). 
40.  Since our sample begins in the first quarter  of 1954, it is not appropriate  to 
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order autoregressive  and first-order  moving-average  process. With the 
inflation  rates  measured  as deviations  from the ten-year  sample  means, 
denoted  by gr,  this ARIMA process  can be written  as 
(17)  =t  4irt-1i  +  Et  -  OEt-1, 
where  Et is a purely  random  disturbance.  Equation  17 was estimated  by 
the Box-Jenkins  procedure  for changing  samples  ending  in each quarter 
from 1954:1 through  1976:4. The minimum  mean-square-error  forecast 
of the  inflation  rate  in quarter  t +  1 as of quarter  t is 
(18)  7rt+l-  alt 
where  L is the lag operator. 
A striking  result of these estimates  of the predicted  inflation rate, 
shown  in table  4, is the implied  change  in the sum  of the optimal  forecast 
weights  on past inflation  rates.41  Because we assume  that inflation  rates 
follow a stationary  process, our specification  implies that the optimal 
weights  always  sum  to less than  one.42  Until 1970, the implied  sum  of the 
weights  was always  between  0.30 and 0.40. During  the 1970s, the sum 
of the weights  has risen  markedly,  from 0.45 in 1970 to 0.55 in 1973 to 
0.71 in 1976. Since the mean lag has remained  almost constant, the 
rapidly  rising  weights  imply an increased  sensitivity  of the optimal  infla- 
tion forecast  to recent experience.43  This has potentially  important  im- 
plications  for the changing  evidence  on the "accelerationist  hypothesis" 
and  other  issues  that  we shall  not explore  in this  paper.44 
inflation  observation used is the first quarter  of  1947; the sample is extended until 
a full ten years  is available. 
41. It follows from equation 18 that, when the process is represented  as an auto- 
regressive  process,  the sum of the weights  is (s  -  ) / (1  -  0). 
42. Recall that our estimates are based on deviations from the sample mean so 
that  a constant  inflation  rate would eventually  be predicted  accurately. 
43. The mean lag, 1/(1  -  e), was approximately  1.4 quarters  until 1970 and has 
since  been  between 1.5 and 1.6 quarters. 
44. The coefficients of the distributed  lag on past inflation have been regarded 
as a test of the accelerationist  hypothesis that the long-run Phillips curve is vertical. 
This implicitly accepts an idenitifying  restriction  like our equation 14. The evidence 
of  an increasing coefficient on lagged inflation might be better interpreted as  a 
changing  relation between past inflation and expected inflation. For evidence of the 
increasing  coefficients  on past inflation in this context, see Robert J. Gordon, "Infla- 
tion in Recession and Recovery," BPEA, 1:1971, pp.  105-58,  and Otto Eckstein 
and Roger Brinner, The Inflation Process in the United States, A  study prepared 
for the use of the Joint Economic Committee, 2:92  (Government Printing Office, 
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The expected  inflation  rate that affects  the long-term  interest  rate in- 
volves a long horizon  and  not merely  the next quarter.  We can use equa- 
tion 18 to calculate  iteratively  a sequence  of inflation  rates  in future  quar- 
ters.  We define  the expected  inflation  rate  7rt as the weighted  average  of 
the quarterly  predicted  inflation  rates during  the subsequent  ten years, 
where the weights  reflect  discounting  of future  inflation  by the interest 
rate.  Moderate  changes  in the averaging  period  would  have  no appreciable 
effect  on our analysis.45 
Equation  19 presents  the estimated  interest-rate  equation  based  on the 
optimal  inflation  forecast: 
(19)  it  =  2.9  +  0.94  ir. 
(0.09) 
Sample  period: 1954:1-1976:4;  2  =0.53;  Durbin-Watson  =  0.13. 
The estimate  of 0.94 is very close to one and certainly  not significantly 
different.  Thus, this estimate,  based on an optimal  Box-Jenkins  forecast 
of future  inflation,  is very similar  to the traditional  distributed-lag  esti- 
mate  of equation  16. 
Forecasting  inflation  on the basis of past inflation  is clearly  more ap- 
propriate  at some times  than at others.  If the reduction  in inflation  rates 
after  the Korean  War  was properly  anticipated,  the estimates  of expected 
inflation  based  on past  inflation  rates  would  be too high  for the early  years 
in table 4. We have therefore  reestimated  equations  16 and 19 for the 
period  beginning  in 1960. The results  are  quite  similar  to the estimates  for 
the entire  sample:  the  weights  sum  to 0.75 with  the polynomial  distributed 
lag, and the coefficient  is 0.88 when  the predicted-inflation  variable  (4) 
is used. 
The very low Durbin-Watson  statistics  of our estimated  equations  in- 
dicate an extremely  high first-order  autocorrelation  of  the stochastic 
errors.  This is just what  we would expect  in an efficient  market  for long- 
term bonds. The change in the long-term  interest  rate from quarter  to 
quarter  (and therefore  the change  in the price  of the asset) would be ex- 
pected to depend on changes in such fundamental  determinants  as the 
expected  inflation  rate  with  a stochastic  disturbance  that  is serially  uncor- 
related  and that therefore  cannot  be predicted.  This serial  independence 
45. When we return  to explicit analysis of the internal rate of return in the next 
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Table  4. The Long-Term  Interest  Rate and  the Predicted  Inflation  Rate, 1954-76 
Percent 
Long-term  interest Predicted  inflation 
Year  rate  (it)  rate  (14) 
1954  2.9  2.9 
1955  3.2  2.7 
1956  3.7  2.6 
1957  4.4  2.6 
1958  4.0  2.2 
1959  4.8  2.3 
1960  4.7  2.4 
1961  4.4  1.9 
1962  4.2  1.7 
1963  4.2  1.7 
1964  4.4  1.7 
1965  4.5  1.8 
1966  5.4  2.0 
1967  5.8  1.9 
1968  6.5  2.3 
1969  7.7  3.1 
1970  8.5  3.3 
1971  7.4  3.6 
1972  7.2  3.2 
1973  7.7  4.3 
1974  9.0  8.0 
1975  9.0  5.2 
1976  8.3  5.2 
Sources: The long-terrn  interest rate is an average of yields on new issues of high-grade corporate bonds 
adjusted to  the comparable Aaa rate. The series was provided by Data Resources, Inc. The  predicted 
inflation rate is the weighted (discounted) average of  ten years of  quarterly Box-Jenkins forecasts  (see 
text). 
in first  differences  corresponds  to the observed  high autocorrelation  when 
the level of the interest  rate  is the dependent  variable.  The high autocor- 
relation  of the  residuals  implies  that  our  method  of estimation  is inefficient 
and that the standard  errors  are underestimated.  We have not, however, 
followed  the common  statistical  procedure  of estimating  the equation  in 
first-difference  form (or, more generally,  after an autoregressive  trans- 
formation)  because  we believe that doing so would introduce  a substan- 
tial errors-in-variables  bias. Specifically,  we recognize  that a variable  like 
?rg is only an imperfect  measure  of expected  inflation.  Because  inflation 
(and presumably  expected inflation) has changed substantially  during 
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variance  of the true (but unobserved) expected inflation.  A relatively 
small amount  of "noise"  will cause a correspondingly  small downward 
bias in the coefficient  of the 7rt  variable.  In contrast,  taking  the first  dif- 
ferences  of the 7t  series would eliminate  most of the systematic  com- 
ponent of its variance  while leaving the measurement  error.  The result 
would  be a very  substantial  bias in the coefficient.  In terms  of the mean- 
square  error  of the estimated  coefficient,  it is better  to accept the ineffi- 
ciency  of ordinary  least-squares  estimation  of the untransformed  equation 
than  to subject  the estimates  to a much  more  serious  bias.46 
To explore this view, we did estimate  equation 19 with a first-order 
autoregressive  transformation.  The maximum-likelihood  procedure  im- 
plied  a serial  correlation  of 0.99 and  parameter  estimates  as follows: 
(20)  it  =  5.0  +  0.14  t  A- O.99ut1 
(1.8)  (0.08) 
Sample  period: 1954:1-1976:4; R2 =  0. 97; Durbin-Watson  =  1. 8. 
We regard  the very  low parameter  estimate  of 0.14 as an indication  of the 
relative  error  variance  in the quarterly  changes  in 7r rather  than as evi- 
dence that the true coefficient of  7zr is  so low.  This  conclusion  is  sup- 
ported  by using an instrumental-variable  procedure  to estimate  equation 
19 in first-difference  form:47 
(21)  it  -  it-1  =  0.04 +  0.66 (irA  -  7rtl). 
(0.04)  (0.22) 
Sample  period: 1954:1-1976:4; Durbin-Watson  =  1. 86. 
The estimated  inflation  coefficient  of 0.66 (with a standard  error  of 0.22) 
is much  closer  to the basic  parameter  values  of equations  16 and 19. 
Although  our evidence  is thus roughly  consistent  with Irving  Fisher's 
conclusion  that the interest  rate rises by the rate of inflation,  both the 
mechanism  and  the implications  are quite  different.  The rise in the nomi- 
nal rate of interest  reflects  the impact  of the tax and depreciation  rules. 
Although  the nominal  interest  rate  rises  by approximately  the increase  in 
expected  inflation,  the net result is far from neutral.  For the individual 
lender,  the rise in the nominal  interest  rate is sufficient  to keep the real 
46.  As noted in the text, the substantial autocorrelation does, however, imply 
that our standard  errors  are underestimated. 
47. The first-difference  specification is essentially equivalent to the maximum- 
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return  before  tax unchanged,  but implies a sharp  fall in the real return 
after  tax.  For example,  a lender  with a 50 percent  marginal  tax rate  could 
find  a real  net yield  of 3 percent  in the absence  of inflation  reduced  to zero 
by a 6 percent  inflation. 
Inflation  is also not neutral  from the firm's  point of view. With an in- 
crease  in the interest  rate equal to the increase  in inflation,  the real net 
interest  cost to the firm  falls substantially.  But, as tables  2 and 3 showed, 
the potential  real net interest  rate that the firm  can pay also falls. There 
is neutrality  with  respect  to the firm  and therefore  with respect  to invest- 
ment  only if the actual  rate  falls by an equal  amount.  Equivalently,  there 
is neutrality  only if the actual  and  potential  nominal  interest  rates  rise by 
an equal  amount.  If the first  rises  by more  than the second,  the firm  must 
adjust  by reducing  investment. 
Changes  in Tax Rules, Inflation,  and Pretax  Profitability 
We return  now to the method  of analyzing  the effects  of changes  in tax 
rules  and  inflation  rates  that  was developed  in the first  section.  We extend 
this method here to deal with forecasts  of changing  inflation  rates and 
with  fluctuations  in the  pretax  rates  of return. 
Our  analysis  begins  by deriving  for each  quarter  between  the first  quar- 
ter of 1954 and the final  quarter  of 1976 the maximum  potential  interest 
rate that is compatible  with our "standard  investment"  project.  For this 
calculation  we assume  that  debt  finances  one-third  of the investment.  One 
series of such internal  rates of return  is derived  on the assumption  of a 
constant  6 percent  risk differential  between  the pretax  yields on debt and 
equity. We refer to this variable as MPIR33G to denote a maximum 
potential  interest  rate  based  on 33 percent  debt  finance  and a gross-of-tax 
risk differential.  As table 2 showed, changing  the risk differential  from 
6 percent  to any other  constant  would change  all of the internal  rates of 
return  only by a constant  and would therefore  not alter the regression 
results;  in more formal language,  the risk-differential  parameter  is not 
identifiable  on the  basis  of available  experience.  A second  series  is derived 
on the assumption  of a constant  6 percent  risk differential  between  the 
net-of-tax  yields  on debt and equity;  we denote  this MPIR33N.  The risk- 
differential  parameter  is again  not identifiable. 
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to quarter:  tax rules,  inflation,  and pretax  profitability.  For each quarter 
we use the tax rules that were appropriate  for that quarter  and assume 
that  they  would  not be changed  during  the life of the project.  We also use 
an optimal  Box-Jenkins  forecast  equation  to obtain  quarterly  forecasts  of 
inflation  rates  on the  basis  of the information  then  available.  The tax rules 
and  inflation  forecasts  are  combined  using  the method  outlined  in the first 
section  to obtain  an  estimated  internal  rate  of return. 
In performing  that operation,  it is also appropriate  to relax the as- 
sumption  that the "standard  investment"  project has the same pretax 
profitability  in every  period.  In practice,  the actual  pretax  rates of profit 
have  experienced  substantial  gyrations  during  the past  twenty-five  years.48 
A permanent  rise or fall in the pretax  profitability  of investment  would 
cause an equivalent  shift in the demand for funds; even a temporary 
change  could cause  some shift.  To allow  for this possibility,  we have also 
calculated  an MPIR series  based on the assumption  that the pretax  in- 
ternal  rate  of return  is not a constant  12 percent  but varies  from quarter 
to quarter.49 
Our  analysis  of changing  profitability  is based  on the series  for the "net 
profit  rate"  developed  in our  previous  paper.  This rate  is measured  as the 
ratio  of corporate  profits  before  tax plus interest  payments  to the sum of 
fixed  capital,  inventories,  and land. The data relate to nonfinancial  cor- 
porations  and are corrected  for changes  in the price level. Both profits 
and capital  stock are net of the Commerce  Department  estimate  of eco- 
nomic depreciation.  We have interpolated  the annual series to obtain 
quarterly  figures. 
It would  be incorrect  to assume  that firms  extrapolate  short-run  varia- 
tions  in profitability  to the entire  life of their  investments.  We posit  instead 
that  the demand  for funds  is based  on a cyclically  adjusted  value  of profit- 
ability.  Specifically,  we follow our earlier  analysis  of profitability  and re- 
late the profit  rate  to the concurrent  rate of capacity  utilization.  We then 
use this  equation  to estimate  the profit  rate  that  would  be expected  in each 
quarter  if the capacity  utilization  were a standard  83.1 percent,  the aver- 
age  for the sample  period.  This cyclically  adjusted  profit  rate  is then  used 
to recalibrate  the maximum  potential  interest  rate for each quarter.  We 
use  the  suffix  AP to denote  a variable  expressing  the internal  rate  of return 
48. See Feldstein and Summers,  "Is the Rate of Profit  Falling?" 
49. This is equivalent to changing the parameter  ao of equation I each quarter 
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Table 5. Values  of Maximum  Potentfal  Interest  Rate for Standard  Investment 
Project,  1954-76a 
Percent 
Constant  pretax  Varying  pretax 
profitability  profitability 
Year  MPIR33G  MPIR33N  MPIR33GAP  MPIR33NAP 
1954  5.7  5.4  4.6  4.1 
1955  5.9  5.6  5.3  4.9 
1956  6.0  5.7  4.1  3.5 
1957  5.5  5.9  4.0  3.3 
1958  6.0  5.7  4.2  3.5 
1959  6.1  5.8  5.0  4.5 
1960  6.1  5.8  4.6  4.0 
1961  6.0  5.6  4.9  4.3 
1962  6.4  6.0  5.8  5.3 
1963  6.5  6.2  6.1  5.7 
1964  7.1  6.8  7.0  6.7 
1965  7.3  7.2  7.4  7.2 
1966  7.3  7.1  6.8  6.6 
1967  7.2  7.1  6.2  5.9 
1968  6.9  6.7  5.7  5.3 
1969  6.5  6.4  4.2  3.7 
1970  6.8  6.9  3.9  3.4 
1971  7.4  7.6  4.9  4.6 
1972  7.7  7.9  5.0  4.6 
1973  7.9  8.3  3.8  3.5 
1974  8.4  9.6  2.7  2.8 
1975  8.3  9.0  5.2  5.2 
1976  8.2  8.8  4.8  4.8 
Source: Derived by method explained in the text. 
a.  All MPIR variables are based on debt financing  for one-third of the investment and risk differentials 
of 6 percent. See text for definitions of the symbols. 
that has been adjusted  for variations  in profitability;  thus MPIR33NAP 
is the MPIR  variable  that  is based  on a risk  differential  net of tax and  that 
has  a varying  profitability. 
Table 5 shows  the four MPIR variables  corresponding  to differentials 
gross  of tax and  net of tax and  to fixed  and  varying  profitability.  Note that 
differences  in the average  level reflect  the risk  differential.  Variations  over 
time within each series are therefore  more important  than differences 
among  the series. 
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affect  the actual  long-term  rate of interest.  If the supply  of funds to the 
nonfinancial  corporate  sector were completely  inelastic, the actual in- 
terest  rate  would be expected  to rise by the same amount  as the MPIR. 
In the traditional  language  of public  finance,  the full effect  of changes  in 
the tax rules  would  then  be borne  by capital  in the corporate  sector.  More 
generally,  however,  the supply of capital to the nonfinancial  corporate 
sector  is not fixed  but is an increasing  function  of the nominal  rate of in- 
terest. The elasticity  of the supply of funds to nonfinancial  corporate 
business  and  the elasticity  of the demand  for funds  by those  firms  together 
determine  how much a tax-induced  shift in the demand  for funds raises 
the return  to capital.  For a given  demand  elasticity,  the effect  on the equi- 
librium  interest  rate of a shift in demand  varies  inversely  with the elas- 
ticity of supply.  The greater  the supply  elasticity,  the greater  will be the 
increase  in corporate  investment  relative  to that  in the rate  of interest. 
Although  an estimate  of the elasticity  of supply  of funds to the non- 
financial  corporate  sector  is not available,  the relative  magnitude  of the 
funds raised  by this sector  is informative.  Between 1970 and 1975, the 
funds raised  in credit  markets  by all nonfinancial  sectors  totaled $1,029 
billionA50  Of this, corporate  bonds accounted  for only $107 billion. The 
total funds raised  by corporations,  including  bank borrowing  and mort- 
gages as well as bonds, totaled $334 billion, or only about one-third  of 
total funds raised.  The obligations  of state and local governments  alone 
accounted  for $89 billion; net borrowing  for residential  mortgages  was 
$253 billion. It is clear that fluctuations  in the demand for borrowed 
funds by corporations  due to changes  in tax rules and productivity  may 
be small  relative  to the total  flow  of funds  in credit  markets.  The potential 
supply  of long-term  lending  from abroad  and the elasticity  of financial 
saving  with respect  to the real rate  of interest  strengthen  this conclusion. 
Although  a more  extensive  analysis  of this  issue  would  be desirable,  these 
crude  figures  do suggest  that the elasticity  of supply  of funds to the cor- 
porate  sector  may  be substantial.  If so, the effect  of changes  in MPIR on 
the actual  interest  rate  will  be correspondingly  small. 
In using the MPIR variable  to estimate  the effect  on the interest  rate 
of the shifts  in the demand  for funds  induced  by tax changes,  it is impor- 
tant to adjust  for the concurrent  shifts in supply caused by changes  in 
expected  inflation.  To control  for such changes  in the interest  rate, our 
50. The statistics in this paragraph  are from the Flow of Funds Accounts of the 
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regression  equation  relates  the interest  rate to the expected  rate of infla- 
tion (7r*) as  well as to the appropriate  MPIR  variable:  51 
(22)  it=  ao -H  al  MPIR +  a27r 
The coefficient  of the MPIR variable  can therefore  measure  the net effect 
of tax changes;  in terms  of the last diagram,  this net effect  is (i4 -i)I 
(i  -  i0,), or the ratio of the change  in the interest  rate that would occur 
with  a fixed  supply  curve  of funds  (i4 -  i0) to the change  that  would  occur 
if that supply  were perfectly  inelastic (i]  -  i0).52  The total impact  of an 
increase  of 1 percentage  point in the expected  rate of inflation  can be 
calculated  as the sum  of (1 ) the coefficient  of the expected  inflation  vari- 
able,  a2, and (2)  the product  of the coefficient  of the MPIR variable  and 
the value  of dMPIR/d7r  implied  by calculations  leading  to table 2. 
Although  time is required  to change  investment  and thereby  to alter 
the equilibrium  return  on investment,  the prices  of bonds and stocks can 
adjust  very  quickly  to reflect  this eventual  long-run  equilibrium.  A failure 
to adjust  quickly would otherwise  provide opportunities  for profitable 
speculation.  We therefore  specify  that  the interest  rate adjusts  to changes 
in MPIR  within  the quarter. 
The estimated  coefficients  of equation  22 for each of the concepts  of 
MPIR are  presented  in table  6. Note first  that  the evidence  favors  the less 
restricted  polynomial distributed-lag  specification  of  shifting inflation 
expectations  (equations  6-1 to 6-4) over  the  Box-Jenkins  forecast  (equa- 
tions 6-5 to 6-8)."3  We will therefore  concentrate  our comments  on the 
results  based  on the  former  specification  and  return  to the remaining  equa- 
tions afterward.  It is not possible to choose between  the gross-risk-dif- 
51.  Our analysis uses both the polynomial distributed-lag  specification and the 
variable constructed from Box-Jenkins forecasts. Factors other than infiation also 
shift the supply of funds available to the nonfinancial corporate sector: (1)  shifts 
in saving behavior; (2)  shifts in liquidity preference;  and (3)  shifts in the demand 
for funds by governments,  by the rest of the world, and by investors in residential 
real estate. Although none of these shifts is likely to be caused by the changes in the 
tax rates that shift the demand by nonfinancial corporate business, we cannot be 
certain that the shifts in supply that are not caused by inflation are uncorrelated 
with our explanatory  variables. 
52. This method assumes that the response of the interest rate to a change in the 
demand  function is the same regardless  of the cause of the shift-tax  rules, inflation, 
and pretax  profitability. 
53. This may reflect the fact that the MPIR variable already contains the Box- 
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ferential  concept of MPIR (equations 6-1 and 6-2)  and the net-risk- 
differential  concept (6-3 and 6-4)  on the basis of the goodness  of fit of 
the equations.54  Similarly,  the evidence  does not favor either  the MPIR 
variable  based  on constant  pretax  profitability  (6-1 and  6-3) or that  based 
on changing  profitability.  Fortunately,  the same basic conclusions  are 
implied  by all four  specifications. 
First, a shift in the demand  for funds appears  to raise the long-term 
interest  rate  by approximately  one-fourth  of the increase  in the MPIR;  a 
rise of 100 basis points  in MPIR would  thus raise the long-term  interest 
rate by approximately  25 basis points.55  This indicates  that the supply 
of funds to the corporate  sector  is quite elastic. Apparently,  investment 
incentives  aimed  at the corporate  sector do raise investment  rather  than 
dissipating  because  of offsetting  increases  in the return  to debt  and  equity 
capital.  In terms  of the third  diagram,  the estimate  implies  that i4  - io  is 
only about one-fourth  of i, -  i,  because  the expansion  of corporate  in- 
vestment  reduces  the  pretax  rate  of return  on investment.58 
The extent  to which  the increase  in corporate  investment  represents  an 
increase  in total national  investment  depends  on the offsetting  effect of 
the higher  interest  rate.  If the total supply  of investable  funds  were  fixed, 
traditional  investment  incentives  would succeed only in transferring  in- 
vestment  to corporate  business  from  other  sectors,  such as homebuilding. 
But the supply  of investable  funds  is not fixed. Total investment  can in- 
crease  because  savings  rise,  the net international  capital  flow  to the United 
States  increases,  or the government  reduces  its deficit.  Indeed,  a principal 
rationale  for investment  incentives  has been to maintain  aggregate  de- 
mand  with  a smaller  government  deficit.  The effect  of tax-induced  changes 
in MPIR on total national  investment  requires  an analysis  that goes be- 
yond  the  current  framework. 
The present  study  can also provide  only partial  information  about  the 
54. The R2  values are extremely close; although this is not itself an accurate 
guide in the presence of high serial correlation, the Durbin-Watson  statistic and the 
R2 together imply that the evidence offers little basis for choice between the models. 
55. The point estimates vary between 0.12 with MPIR33NAP and 0.43 with 
MPIR33G. 
56.  Robert E. Hall and Dale W. Jorgenson are not far from the truth in their 
assumption  that the interest rate remains constant when tax incentives vary; to the 
extent that their assumption is wrong, they overstate the tax-induced  changes in the 
desired capital stock. See their "Tax Policy and Investment Behavior," American 
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incidence  of changes  in the corporate  tax rules. The estimate  that a, is 
approximately  0.25 suggests  that only a small part of the increase in 
MPIR  is shifted  to the corporate  bondholder.  The more  general  question 
of the extent to which the incidence  of the tax change  is shifted from 
capital  in general  to labor  cannot  be answered  accurately  on the basis of 
current  information.  The answer  depends  on the change  in the return  to 
capital  outside the corporate  sector and on the share of the corporate 
sector  in the total capital  stock. Consider,  for example,  a change  in the 
corporate  tax that implies  an increase  of 100 basis points in MPIR and 
that causes a rise of 25 basis points in the long-term  bond rate. If the 
return  to all other  forms  of capital  also increased  by 25 basis points and 
if corporate  capital  accounted  for one-third  of the total privately  owned 
capital  stock, 75 percent  of the benefit  of the tax change  would fall on 
capital  and  25 percent  on labor.57  Since  corporate  bonds  and  other  securi- 
ties are not perfect  substitutes,  it would probably  be more reasonable  to 
assume  that the average  rise in the yield on capital  is less than 25 basis 
points. This in turn  would imply that capital  as a whole bears less than 
75 percent  of the effect  of stimulative  changes  in corporate  tax rules.  The 
remainder  would  be shifted  to labor through  the higher  productivity  and 
wages that result from increased  investment.  This estimate  must be re- 
garded  as preliminary  and  subject  to substantial  error. 
The estimated  effect  of changes  in expected  inflation  support  the con- 
clusion of the second section that the long-term  bond rate rises by ap- 
proximately  the same amount  as the increase  in inflation.  Although  the 
corporate  MPIR variable  rises  by about  one-fifth  more  than the increase 
in inflation,  the effect  of inflation  on the supply  of funds  to the corporate 
sector  implies  that  the net change  is smaller  than  this. In terms  of the last 
diagram,  if the investment-demand  schedule  is shifted  by inflation  alone, 
i  -  i  would exceed 7r.  But il  -  i, is found to be approximately equal to 
7r,  which  implies  that  inflation  substantially  reduces  the real net return  to 
lenders. 
We turn  finally  to the estimates  of equations  6-5 to 6-8, which  use the 
Box-Jenkins  variable  to indicate  shifts  in the supply  of funds.  These  equa- 
tions provide  a less satisfactory  explanation  of variations  in the interest 
57. More generally, the share of a corporate  tax change that is borne by capital 
in general equals the rise in the average return to capital (relative to the change in 
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rate.  The results  are also quite  sensitive  to whether  MPIR is adjusted  for 
changes  in profitability.  With no such adjustment,  the results are quite 
unsatisfactory.58  In contrast  with the cyclically  adjusted  MPIR variable 
(equations  6-6 and 6-8),  the results are very similar  to the estimates 
based on the distributed-lag  specification  of inflation.  Moreover,  when 
these  equations  are  estimated  in first-difference  form (using  instrumental- 
variable  estimation)  the  parameter  values  are  quite  stable.  The coefficient 
of MPIR33GAP  is 0.53 (with a standard  error  of 0.44)  and the coeffi- 
cient of 7rre  is 0.96 (0.57);  with MPIR33NAP,  the corresponding  coeffi- 
cients  are  0.31 (0.27) andO.91  (0.46). 
To examine  the possibility  that  the long-term  interest  rate responds  to 
cyclical  conditions  directly,  we reestimated  the equations  of table 6 with 
capacity  utilization  as an additional  variable.  In general,  its coefficient 
was small and statistically  insignificant.  In one key specification,  corre- 
sponding  to equation  6-2, the capacity-utilization  variable  was signifi- 
cantly  positive  (implying  that an increase  of 1 percentage  point in capac- 
ity utilization  has the direct  effect  of raising  the long-term  interest  rate  by 
5 basis points) and the coefficient  of the MPIR variable  was reduced  to 
0.07 with a standard  error  of 0.10. This suggests  a further  reason  for cau- 
tion in interpreting  the point estimates  of the coefficient  of the MPIR 
variable  but  supports  the  conclusion  that  the actual  interest  rate  is changed 
very  little by tax-induced  shifts  in the maximum  potential  rate  of interest. 
Obviously,  the estimates  presented  in this section must be treated  as 
preliminary  and regarded  with caution.  However,  they offer no grounds 
for rejecting  the conclusion  of the second section that an increase  in the 
rate of inflation  causes an approximately  equal increase  in the nominal 
pretax  interest  rate. This conclusion  supports  the analytic  results  of the 
first  section  that the tax deductibility  of interest  payments  just about  off- 
sets the historic-cost  method  of depreciation.  Finally, the results  of this 
section  suggest  that  the supply  of funds  to the nonfinancial  corporate  sec- 
tor  is elastic  enough  to make  a tax-induced  change  in the maximum  poten- 
tial interest  rate  cause  a substantially  smaller  change  in the actual  interest 
rate. 
58. The coefficients of the MPIR variables in equations 6-5 and 6-7 are both 
unreasonably high. When these  equations are estimated in  first-difference  form 
(using instrumental-variable  estimation) the MPIR coefficients become very small 
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Conclusion 
The primary  emphasis  of this paper has been on the interaction  of 
taxes and inflation  in determining  the interest  rate on long-term  bonds. 
The current  U.S. tax system makes the impact of inflation  much more 
complex  than  it was in Irving  Fisher's  time. The basic Fisherian  conclu- 
sion that anticipated  inflation  has no effect  on real variables  is no longer 
correct. 
We began our analysis  by calculating  the interest  rate that a firm  can 
pay on a "standard  investment"  project  if its investment  is financed  one- 
third  by debt and two-thirds  by equity.  The deduction  of interest  pay- 
ments  in calculating  taxable  income  implies  that this maximum  potential 
interest  rate  rises  by more  than  the rate of inflation.  Offsetting  this is the 
use of historic-cost  depreciation,  which makes the MPIR rise less than 
the rate of inflation.  On balance,  we find  that the maximum  potential  in- 
terest  rate  rises  by approximately  the same  amount  as the rate  of inflation, 
with the sign of the difference  depending  on the assumption  about the 
relation  between  debt  and  equity  yields. 
Our econometric  estimates  of the relation  between  inflation  and the 
long-term  interest  rate confirm  that the nominal rate rises by approxi- 
mately  the rate of inflation.  This implies  that the real interest  rate net of 
tax available  to investors  is reduced  dramatically  by inflation.  For ex- 
ample,  an investor  who pays a 50 percent  marginal  tax rate  will find  that 
a real  net-of-tax  return  that  is 2 percent  in the absence  of inflation  vanishes 
when  there  is a 4 percent  rate  of inflation. 
The fall in the real net rate of interest  received  by investors  also cor- 
responds  to -a  fall in the real net cost of debt capital  to firms.  It is wrong, 
however,  to regard  this as a major  stimulus  to investment.  The analysis 
of the first  section  shows  that an inflation-induced  fall in the real net-of- 
tax rate of interest  at which  firms  can borrow  is not a stimulus  to invest- 
ment  because,  given  the tax and depreciation  rules,  inflation  also reduces 
by about  as much  the maximum  real  net-of-tax  interest  rate  that  they can 
afford  to pay  on a standard  investment. 
Although  our analysis  has emphasized  the interaction  between taxes 
and  inflation,  we have also been interested  in the effects  of corporate  tax 
changes themselves.  The results of the first section showed that the 
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years  would,  in the absence  of inflation,  have increased  the maximum  in- 
terest rate that firms could afford  by about 2 percentage  points. Our 
econometric  estimates  in the third  section  suggest  that  the elasticity  of the 
supply  of funds to purchase  corporate  debt is great enough  that the in- 
terest  rate  actually  rises  by only about  one-fourth  of the potential  increase 
induced  by changes  in corporate  rules. The tax changes  that were de- 
signed  to stimulate  corporate  investment  were  therefore  not offset  by the 
resulting  increases  in the  interest  rate. 
We believe that we have a useful analytic  method for studying  the 
effect  of alternative  tax rules.  By translating  the changes  in tax rules and 
inflation  into corresponding  changes  in the maximum  rate that firms  can 
pay for capital,  we can study  the changes  in investment  incentives  and in 
the response  of market  yields. We plan to extend  our analysis  to include 
a more  general  model of corporate  finance  and to study  a wider  range  of 
problems. Comments  and 
Discussion 
William  J. Fellner:  The paper  before  us has the merit  of analyzing  a prob- 
lem that clearly  deserves  more attention  than it has received:  the depen- 
dence of Fisherian conclusions  on Fisherian assumptions.  We should 
appreciate  the opportunity  of giving  consideration  to this problem. 
My comments  on specific  elements  of the argument  may  turn  out to be 
overly  critical,  because  it is so much easier  to express  reservations  about 
the results of this type of research  than to perform  it. The gist of my 
criticism  is that, after  carrying  us through  many combinations  of a large 
number  of individual  assumptions,  the paper  never gets rid of assump- 
tions that eliminate  some of the most essential  real-world  properties  of 
the  problem. 
To begin by accentuating  the positive, I think the authors  are quite 
right  in stressing  that,  with  a nonindexed  tax structure  and  with  deductible 
interest  costs, we should reject the proposition  that the money rate of 
interest  will generally  tend to rise by the number  of basis  points express- 
ing the expected rate of inflation.  This Fisherian  relation depends, of 
course,  on specific  assumptions;  for example,  it does not take account  of 
the shifting  of part of the increased  nominal  interest  cost from the bor- 
rower to the Treasury,  through  the deductibility  of that cost from the 
borrower's  taxable  income.  Nor is the Fisherian  proposition  intended  to 
take  account  of various  other  complicating  factors.  Hence, as the authors 
rightly  suggest,  in our  world  the  Fisherian  relation  can  be expected  to hold 
only when  offsetting  forces  happen  to be at work  in the right  proportions. 
We do need to think  the problem  through  on modified  assumptions. 
However,  to my mind, the minimum  complexity  that useful modified 
assumptions  would  have to accommodate  to preserve  essential  aspects  of 
the  problem  would  reflect  the recognition  that  expectations  are  not single- 
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valued.  There  is variance  (dispersion) about  the mean value of expecta- 
tions concerning  the inflation  rate as well as concerning  other  variables. 
These characteristics  of the expectational  system  are disregarded  in the 
paper's  conclusion  that the bond rate borrowers  feel they can afford  to 
pay for an unchanging  amount  of loans will rise by twice the number  of 
basis  points  expressing  the expected  rate of inflation.  This is the conclu- 
sion of the authors  for a 50 percent  corporate  income  tax and deductible 
interest,  and neglecting  at this point the distorting  effect of depreciation 
rules and of changing  tax credits.  As the authors  realize,  this conclusion 
implies  that borrowers  fail to react to the observed  substantial  variance 
about  the  actual  inflation  rates. 
Let us be somewhat  more specific  and assume  in a first step that, in 
accordance  with the Fisherian  relation,  the bond rate does rise by pre- 
cisely the equivalent  of the expected  inflation;  and let us assume  in the 
next analytical  step that  when  this Fisherian-type  relation  holds the bor- 
rowers  are  paying  less interest  for a given  amount  of loans than  they  think 
they can afford  to pay, because  they are gaining  back 50 percent  of the 
increase in nominal interest cost through deductibility.  Accepting the 
qualification  Feldstein  and Summers  make  concerning  depreciation  rules 
and changes  in investment  credits  and the like, this reasoning  should  put 
us on the way to concluding  along their lines that, for an unchanging 
amount  of loans, the borrowers  will turn out to bid up the nominal  in- 
terest  rate  by twice  the equivalent  of the expected  inflation  rate. 
But are  we really  on the way to that  conclusion?  In the first  place, bor- 
rowers  are  apt  to have  nonlinear  utility  functions  and  to be strongly  influ- 
enced  by the possibility  that  the actual  inflation  rate  may not be the same 
as its probabilistically  "expected"  value. Hence the "expected"  inflation 
rate-or,  with a 50 percent  tax, twice the expected  rate-is  not the sole 
relevant  determinant  of the inflation-induced  change  in the bidding  be- 
havior  of borrowers  who are likely to be risk averse.  Not only does the 
public  know  that  the actual  inflation  rate  may  turn  out to be different  from 
the "expected"  rate, but in inflationary  circumstances  the risk that other 
relevant  variables  will deviate  from  their  probabilistically  expected  values 
would also be apt to increase,  even if the debt-equity  ratios of the bor- 
rower  remained  unchanged.  Further,  and equally  important,  by way of 
simplification  the paper admittedly  disregards  the increase  of the risks 
perceived  by the borrowers  when,  as a result  of a sufficiently  elastic  loan- 
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flationary  conditions.  My conclusion  thus is that even aside from the 
authors'  explicit  qualifications  concerning  depreciation  rules and chang- 
ing tax incentives,  we have no good reason  to accept  the hypothesis  of a 
rise in money  interest  on a given amount  of loans by about  twice the ex- 
pected  inflation  rate. 
I would  plead ignorance  even about  whether,  quite  aside from depre- 
ciation  rules and changing  tax incentives,  the money  rate would tend to 
rise  more or less than  is suggested  by the "Fisherian"  relation.  In my ap- 
praisal,  assuming  away the problem  of shifts between  long- and short- 
term funds worsens the difficulties  of relating the Feldstein-Summers 
analysis  to reality.  To become  manageable,  a problem  of this complexity 
does, of course,  have to be simplified;  but I believe  that the kind of con- 
ceptual  simplification  adopted  in this analysis  buries  too much of what 
jumps  to the eye in the  real  world. 
As for the empirical  tests performed  and discussed  by the authors, 
these are intended  to demonstrate  that influences  tending  to raise the 
money  interest  rate  by more  than  the equivalent  of expected  inflation  have 
been roughly  offset  by opposing  influences.  The Fisherian  relation  does 
therefore  appear  to hold by and  large,  but in our environment  not for the 
reasons  Fisher  regarded  as relevant  on his assumptions.  I must  admit  that 
I have  remained  unconvinced  by the argument  that these  tests have come 
out reasonably  well. This is only partly  because  my nontechnical  (com- 
mon-sense) judgment  tells me that many of the residuals  listed in the 
paper  are  disturbingly  large.  It is also partly  because  I do not follow the 
reasoning  of the authors  according  to which we should acquiesce  in the 
finding  that one way of performing  a test involves  an error  in variables, 
while other  ways of performing  it reveal  other significant  deficiencies  of 
the  results. 
As a reader  and a discussant  who has expressed  a number  of reserva- 
tions, I want  to add that a paper  as intriguing  and thought-provoking  as 
the  one before  us performs  a very  useful  function. 
Robert  J. Gordon:  The Feldstein-Summers  paper  deals with questions  of 
great concern  for policy. The United States  is entering  its third  year of 
inflation  at a relatively  constant  and well-predicted  rate.  Traditional  eco- 
nomic analysis  attaches  quite small welfare costs to a steady and fully 
anticipated  inflation,  but this analysis  is valid  only in the absence  of taxa- 
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respect  to inflation.  The paper attempts  to quantify  the degree  of non- 
neutrality  in the present  U.S. tax system. It shows convincingly  that a 
steady  inflation,  no matter  how well anticipated,  substantially  reduces  the 
real after-tax  return  to savers,  distorts  the incentives  for both investment 
and saving, and results in a continuing  redistribution  of income from 
savers  to the  government. 
In the absence  of taxation, and with an inelastic supply of loanable 
funds,  anticipated  inflation  would  raise  the  nominal  interest  rate  and  leave 
the real  interest  rate unchanged.  With  neutral  taxation,  the real after-tax 
interest  rate would remain  unchanged  while the nominal  before-tax  rate 
earned  on investment  projects  would  increase  by the rate  of inflation  times 
1/(1  -  T).  If the total tax on capital  (r)  is 50 percent,  then an accelera- 
tion of 5 percentage  points  in inflation,  such as the United  States  has had 
since  the early  1960s, would  raise  the nominal  interest  rate  by 10 percent- 
age points.  That large  a rise obviously  has not occurred,  and as a conse- 
quence  real  after-tax  returns  on bonds  for savers  have  fallen  substantially. 
That  would  create  only a minor  problem  if corporations  were  financed 
entirely  by debt,  due to the deductibility  of interest  payments.  This is the 
case laid out in table 1. The source  of the nonneutrality  arises  from the 
interaction  of three features  of the tax system: the corporation  income 
tax levied  on the nominal  (rather  than  real) returns  on equity;  the double 
impact of the personal  income tax, which further  taxes nominal  equity 
returns  paid out as dividends;  and the historical-cost  basis for deprecia- 
tion, which  reduces  the tax saving  yielded  by depreciation  deductions  as 
compared  to replacement-cost  accounting. 
In the first  section  of their  paper  the authors  have developed  a poten- 
tially useful method  for analyzing  the effect of inflation  and alternative 
tax systems on before-tax and after-tax  returns. Unfortunately,  as it 
stands,  the paper  provides  only a preliminary  application  of the method. 
It devotes  excessive  attention  to the second-order  effects  of minor  changes 
in tax rules  while  ignoring  the first-order  effect  introduced  by the artificial 
assumption  that  the risk  premium  on equities  is both  large  and  fixed. 
The risk  premium,  which  inserts  a large  wedge  between  the real yields 
on equities  and  bonds,  is the most  important  factor  accounting  for the low 
(and sometimes  negative) after-tax  real yields on bonds received by 
savers  reported  in tables  2 and 3. A paradox  emerges:  savers  are willing 
to put up with a negative  real rate  of return  on bonds,  because  bonds are 
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yield is to switch  from bonds to a diversified  portfolio  of equities.  In all 
the examples  such  a switch  results  in a positive  after-tax  real return.  Can 
we really  ignore  the endogeneity  of the risk  premium  between  bonds and 
equities?  Surely,  the Feldstein-Summers  story represents  only the first 
stage of an adjustment  process. Savers would react to a succession of 
negative  real  after-tax  returns  on bonds  and  substantial  positive  real  after- 
tax  returns  on equities  by reevaluating  the exogenous  and  arbitrary  equity- 
bond yield gap. In the standard  mean-variance  framework  for portfolio 
analysis,  the extra  risk investors  are willing  to accept on the risky asset 
depends  on the net mean return  on the portfolio,  which in this case is 
reduced  by inflation  when  the  tax system  is nonneutral. 
Not only should  the risk  differential  properly  be treated  as endogenous, 
but a question  can be raised  about  the large value assumed  for the fixed 
risk  differential  in the paper.  The yield gap between  stock dividends  and 
bond  interest  shifted  from a premium  to a discount  in the 1960s. While 
the authors  do not offer  any empirical  support  for the values of the risk 
premium  that they have assumed,  any attempt  to calculate  a historical 
average  would be extremely  sensitive  to the sample  period used for the 
calculation  (that is, the fractions  of the sample  made  up of the premium 
years  of the 1950s and  the  discountyears  of the 1960s). 
Tables  2 and 3 present  alternative  results  for a risk premium  applied, 
respectively,  to before-tax  and after-tax  yields.  But no allowance  is made 
for the shift  in the composition  of bondholders  from  those subject  to high 
tax rates  to those subject  to low ones. As inflation  raises  taxable  nominal 
yields,  there  is an increased  incentive  for taxpayers  in high tax brackets 
to shift  to tax-free  municipal  bonds, and thus for tax-free  institutions  to 
hold a higher  fraction  of corporate  bonds. Nor is any explicit account 
taken  of the loss-offset  provisions  that make the variance  component  of 
the  equity  yield  essentially  tax  free. 
The second section  of the paper  contains  a number  of regressions  of 
the nominal  interest  rate on various  estimates  of the expected  inflation 
rate,  designed  to test whether  the response  of the nominal  interest  rate to 
inflation  has been unity, in which case the taxation of nominal yields 
would  have caused  a decline  in real after-tax  returns.  This section  is only 
weakly  related  to the first  section  of the paper,  and  in fact is contradicted 
by  it. 
After  an extended  demonstration  of the impact  of inflation  on the real 
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is constrained  to be constant,  thus introducing  a specification  error.  The 
influence  of the balance  of commodity  and money demand  on the real 
interest  rate (the "IS-LM  effect") is also neglected,  despite  its important 
role in earlier  work  by Feldstein  in collaboration  with  Otto Eckstein  and 
Gary  Cham-berlain.  The first  of these specification  errors  is corrected  in 
the  third  section  of the paper,  but  not  the second  error. 
The alternative  estimates  of the expected  inflation  rate all neglect an 
important  criticism  previously  directed  at attempts  to capture  expecta- 
tions  by techniques  that  use only  past  values  of the variable  to be forecast. 
The purely  autoregressive  source  of information  in both the adaptive  and 
ARIMA variants  in the paper  excludes  additional  information  possessed 
by economic agents. As a particularly  dramatic  example,  purely auto- 
regressive  expectations  of inflation  in 1947-48 would have yielded very 
high  positive  forecasts,  whereas  the  Livingston  survey  (of academic,  busi- 
ness, and labor economists) indicated  that a substantial  deflation  was 
actually  expected.  Actual forecasts  took account  of the special  informa- 
tion that a war had just concluded,  and the experience  of 1919-21 was 
regarded  as more relevant  than that of the immediately  preceding  years 
and  quarters.' 
The autoregressive  method  used  by the authors  overestimates  expected 
inflation  in the pre-1959 period  by attaching  weights  estimated  from the 
post-1959 era to the actual  inflation  experience  of the Korean  War and 
the 1956-57 period,  both  of which  were  treated  at the time  by the Living- 
ston panel as unique  and transitory.  While  the 1960s pose no problems, 
with the autoregressive  and Livingston  estimates  in the same range,  dif- 
ficulties  with  "special  knowledge"  arise  in the 1970s. The measured  price 
indexes  on which  the authors  base their  autoregressive  estimates  contain 
major  sources  of variance  that  were  clearly  perceived  at the time  as transi- 
tory (particularly  the wage-price  controls  and the food and oil shocks) 
and  that would  not have been incorporated  into ten-year  price forecasts. 
The result  in table 4 that the expected  rate of inflation  over a ten-year 
horizon  jumped  from  3 percent  in 1972 to 8 percent  in 1974 is thus  highly 
dubious. 
1. I  have previously pointed out  that failure to make special allowances for 
World War I invalidates virtually all previous studies of the inflation-interest  rate 
"Gibson paradox"  for the pre-1930 period. See Robert J. Gordon, "Interest  Rates 
and Prices in the Long Run: A Comnment,"  Journal  of Money, Credit, and Banking, 
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While  the  third  section  of the  paper  corrects  one source  of misspecifica- 
tion of the interest-rate  equations,  by allowing  the nominal  interest  rate 
to depend  on an internal-rate-of-return  construct,  the other sources of 
misspecification  remain  and help to explain  why the Durbin-Watson  sta- 
tistics  in table  6 are so poor. While  specification  problems  may introduce 
several  sources  of bias into table  6, one particular  bias is suggested  by the 
discrepancy  between  the autoregressive  and Livingston  estimates  of ex- 
pected  inflation  in the 1950s. Imagine  that the "true"  expected  inflation 
rate  in the 1950s was close to zero, rather  than in the 2.5 percent  range 
estimated  in table 4. Then the computer  would not be forced to explain 
the increase  in the nominal  interest  rate  between  the 1950s and 1960s by 
the rising  MPIR variable  (the MPIR33G and MPIR33N variants), and 
would  be able  to raise  the coefficient  on expected  inflation  and reduce  the 
coefficient  on MPIR. By this argument,  the high MPIR coefficients  for 
equations  6-1 and 6-3 of table 6 are probably  biased upward,  and the 
inflation  coefficients  are  probably  biased  downward. 
Two broader  issues  are  suggested  by the paper  and  deserve  further  dis- 
cussion and research.  Do savers  really equate the after-tax  real rate of 
return  on bonds (and savings  accounts) with  the after-tax  real  return  net 
of risk  premium  on equities?  In recent  years  both  of these  have  been nega- 
tive,  if the  paper's  assumptions  about  risk  premiums  are  correct.  Yet Feld- 
stein  elsewhere  has made  the standard  classical  economic  assumption  that 
"as a first  approximation,  everyone  equates  his rate of time discount  to 
the net of tax rate  of return  that he receives."  Who are these savers  who 
currently  have a negative  rate  of time  discount?  My own conjecture  is that 
savers  are currently  willing  to hold assets  bearing  a negative  real net-of- 
tax return  because unanticipated  inflation  has thrown  their actual real 
wealth  out of balance  with their  desired  real wealth.  In order  to recover 
the desired  level of real wealth  needed to smooth  lifetime  consumption, 
wealth  is still being  accumulated.  In fact, this positive  response  of saving 
to unanticipated  inflation  may help to explain  why the personal  saving 
rate was substantially  higher in the first half of the 1970s than in the 
1960s. And, since it is a disequilibrium  phenomenon  (which  may persist 
for some time if people choose to regain  their  desired  wealth level grad- 
ually), it does not rule out the equality  of the rate of time discount  with 
the net-of-tax  real return  as a condition  of full steady-state  equilibrium. 
Finally, the nonneutrality  of the tax system with respect to inflation 
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The United  States  is currently  experiencing  a steady  inflation  that  is both 
well anticipated  and highly  resistant  to deceleration  (by either  recession 
or jawboning).  By failing to place any stress at all on tax reforms  that 
would eliminate  the nonneutral  features  of the present  system (particu- 
larly  the taxation  of nominal  rather  than  real yields), the administration 
is condemning  the U.S. economy to continued  distortion  of investment 
and  saving  decisions.  The paper  strongly  implies (even if it does not state 
outright)  that  a substantial  portion  of fiscal  dividends  over  the  next  decade 
should  be devoted  to elimination  of the overtaxation  of the nominal  yield 
on investment  projects. 
General  Discussion 
A number  of discussants  expressed  reservations  about the simplifying 
assumptions  adopted  by Feldstein  and Summers.  John Shoven  was par- 
ticularly  concerned  about  the assumed  fixity  of the marginal  debt-equity 
ratio.  The analysis  in the paper  itself showed  that  inflation  raises  the cost 
of equity  relative  to debt; hence the proportion  of debt financing  should 
be expected  to expand  in an inflationary  period. 
Agreeing  with Fellner's  comments,  Shoven  also was critical  of the as- 
sumption  of a fixed risk premium  between equity and debt securities. 
Thomas  Juster  elaborated  on this  point,  arguing  that  higher  inflation  rates 
had increased  variances,  as people perceived  them. The greater  uncer- 
tainty  led investors  to pay a higher  price  not just for safety  but for flexi- 
bility  as well. Juster  also cautioned  R. J. Gordon  to bear  in mind  that  the 
price  expectations  of the Livingston  panel registered  the views of profes- 
sional economic forecasters-which might be quite different  from the 
inflation  expectations  of key  investors. 
Arthur  Okun  was concerned  about  the assumed  constancy  of the mix 
between  equipment  and  structures.  The net effects  of the tax system's  "un- 
derdepreciation"  and "overdeduction  of interest"  during inflation are 
favorable  for long-lived assets, as the analysis of the paper suggested. 
Judging  by that  element  alone, a shift  toward  structures  should  have  been 
expected in the seventies. In fact, corporate  investment  seems to have 
shifted  toward  equipment  and away  from structures,  perhaps  because  of 
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R. A. Gordon  sought  some disaggregation  of the nonfinancial  corpo- 
rate sector.  He thought  it important  to distinguish,  for example,  between 
utilities,  which rely primarily  upon external  debt financing,  and manu- 
facturing  firms,  which  are  financed  principally  by their  retained  earnings. 
William  Poole suggested  that the careful analysis  by the authors  of 
considerations  affecting  corporate  demands  for funds  should  be replicated 
for the supply  side. It would  have  to consider  tax shelters,  retirement  sav- 
ing, and the like. Benjamin  Friedman  elaborated  on the need for a more 
detailed  supply-side  analysis.  The suppliers  of long-term  debt capital  to 
the corporate  sector are primarily  tax-exempt  investors,  such as pension 
funds,  nonprofit  organizations,  and the reserve  accounts  of life insurance 
companies.  The supply  of equity  finance,  in contrast,  comes  from  sources 
that are subject  to income taxation.  George  von Furstenberg  noted that 
the supply  of funds  to corporations  depended  on the interaction  of taxa- 
tion and inflation  and  on the returns  to residential  capital,  consumer  dur- 
ables, and other  noncorporate  real assets. 
Other  comments  focused on the econometric  results  in the latter  sec- 
tions of the paper. Christopher  Sims insisted  that the values near unity 
of the coefficients  on expected  inflation  in the interest-rate  equations  of 
the second section should be considered  descriptive,  rather  than struc- 
tural.  He considered  it equally  sensible  to reverse  the dependent  and in- 
dependent  variables.  He pointed  to one equation  in which  such a reversal 
led to a coefficient  of expected  inflation  on nominal  interest  rates of 2 
rather  than 1; moreover,  with a correction  for serial  correlation,  the im- 
plied  coefficient  would  be 4. In light  of these  illustrative  calculations,  Sims 
saw a wide range of uncertainty  surrounding  this coefficient.  He also 
doubted  the structural  character  of the equations  in the final section  that 
included  MPIR,  since  that  variable  might  be endogenous. 
Saul Hymans  noted that the econometric  analysis  was conducted  on 
the implicit  assumption  that the rate of inflation  was the only systematic 
factor  shifting  the supply of funds to corporations.  He regarded  this as 
implausible  and inappropriate,  even for a first approximation  of coeffi- 
cient  values. 
Robert  Hall was unconvinced  by the authors'  rationale  for not correct- 
ing  for serial  correlation.  He was also critical  of the use of the fitted  values 
from the regression  equations  on price expectations  as variables  in the 
interest-rate  equations;  he noted that such a procedure  understated  the 
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While the participants  had many reservations  about specific aspects 
of the  paper,  several  congratulated  the authors  for their  pioneering  efforts. 
Von  Furstenberg  predicted  that  the article  would  become  a standard  entry 
on the reading  list of graduate  courses  in public finance.  Okun  felt that 
the introduction  of the debt-equity  constraint  on corporate  financing 
achieved  an  important  qualitative  improvement  in the  Fisherian  analysis. 
Feldstein  responded  to several  issues raised in the discussion.  In re- 
sponse  to Fellner,  he stressed  that  only under  very  special  assumptions- 
historic-cost  depreciation  and full debt financing-would the interest 
rate  be raised  by twice  the equivalent  of the expected  inflation  rate.  Under 
more realistic assumptions,  as tables 2  and 3 demonstrated,  inflation 
would raise  interest  rates  about  point for point. In general,  he noted that 
the main  flavor  of the reservations  expressed  by participants  was that  the 
model in the paper had too many simplifying  assumptions-in effect, 
it was not sufficiently  complicated.  He found this criticism  somewhat 
ironic, since the paper  did introduce  substantially  more complexity  into 
the  Fisherian  framework  by taking  account  of taxes  in general  and  specific 
provisions  of the  tax  law,  by distinguishing  between  debt  and  equity  financ- 
ing, and  by allowing  for risk  premiums.  He hoped  that  the paper  provided 
a framework  for subsequent  analysis  and  research  to make  the debt-equity 
ratio and the debt-equity  yield differentials  endogenous,  to disaggregate 
demands  by types of corporations  and types of assets, and to deal with 
the  supply  of funds  in a more  sophisticated  way. 
Summers  joined  Feldstein  in explaining  that  they viewed  the initial  set 
of simple  regression  equations  relating  the interest  rate  to expected  infla- 
tion as a bridge  from the traditional  Fisherian  equations  to their more 
serious,  subsequent  equations  that include  the MPIR variable.  Summers 
pointed  out that survey  data on inflationary  expectations,  such as those 
from  the Livingston  panel, are confined  to a one-year  horizon  and hence 
cannot  be used to explain  the long-term  interest  rate. Thus the authors 
had  been  forced  to rely  on an autoregressive  specification  of the formation 
of price  expectations,  even though  they recognized  its severe  limitations. 
Responding  to Sims, Summers  defended  the use of expected  inflation  as 
an independent  rather  than dependent  variable.  He saw good theoretical 
reasons  for believing  that  inflationary  expectations  affected  interest  rates, 
rather  than vice versa.  He also observed  that a shift in the mix of invest- 
ment toward  equipment  noted by Okun was probably  the result of the 
investment  tax credit,  which applies  only to equipment. 